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Anti-air warfare (AAW) is a primary naval warfare area. Using AAW tactics 
and concepts of operations, this research explores the most critical success 
factors of convoy operations. In this study, a discrete event simulation (DES) was 
built by modeling ships, and their sensors and weapons, to simulate convoy 
operations under air threat. Where classified data was unavailable, assumptions 
were made and approximations were used in constructing the ships, weapons, 
and sensors. The model was used to simulate over 1.5 million naval battles 
varying 99 input variables using sophisticated and systematically created data 
combinations. To select the input settings over a specific range of input variables, 
a nearly orthogonal nearly balanced (NOB) Latin hypercube design was used. 
The effects of these input changes on the outputs were analyzed using partition 
trees and nominal logistic regression. The primary response variable was the 
survival of the High Value Unit (HVU) as a binary outcome. According to the 
analysis, in a convoy operation under air threat, the surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
specifications of the screen ships, the staying power of the HVU, and the anti-
ship missile (ASM) specifications of the enemy ships had the most significant 
effect on the survival of the HVU.  
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Convoy operations under various threats are among the most critical naval 
missions. Convoy operations are used to achieve many objectives, such as 
providing logistic support to a particular operational area or conducting an 
amphibious assault on enemy territory. While conducting convoy operations, the 
convoy and her escorts are exposed to many potential threats, including 
submarines, fighter airplanes, and/or surface ships, as well as the weapons that 
the opposing force uses. Therefore, the convoy’s escorts need to implement anti-
air, anti-submarine, and surface warfare tactics while conducting the operation. 
While all of these are important, this study focuses on anti-air tactics.  
Simulation models are effective tools for analyzing naval operations. 
Modeling real life phenomena has many challenges, such as efficiently scaling 
the problem and systematically developing software. Verification and validation of 
the model and its inputs is also crucial. The model used in this study has not yet 
been validated. However, the simulation developed for this research, known as 
the AAW Analysis Model, provides a strong basis for analysis options, as it 
includes lots of design parameters. AAW is an acronym for anti-air warfare. 
Moreover, the AAW Analysis Model is scalable, modular, and flexible.  
The AAW Analysis Model is built to analyze the effectiveness of a given 
screen disposition, screen ship properties, and High Value Unit (HVU) properties 
in convoy operations. It can also be used to identify the most effective factors in 
determining the success of convoy operations. The AAW Analysis Model is 
developed using the Simkit library in the Java programming language. It is also a 
unique model that incorporates the effects of screen disposition with a layered 




Figure 1. The AAW Analysis Model. 
Because of the fact that the simulation includes many factors to analyze, 
an efficient design methodology was used to obtain systematically created input 
parameters. For the analysis portion of this research, the AAW Analysis Model 
was run for 1000 replications for each of 512 carefully-chosen design points in 
three different scenarios—resulting in over 1.5 million simulated naval battles. 
The primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) extracted from the AAW 
Analysis Model is the survival of the HVU, a binary outcome that was recorded 
after each simulated battle. After the runs were made, partition trees and nominal 
logistic regression were used to build response surface metamodels to identify 
and quantify the most important factors on convoy operations under air threat. 
The AAW Analysis Model includes hundreds of factors. Of them, 99 were 
chosen for exploration. There were 91 continuous and 8 discrete factors. Of 
these, 52 of them are controllable by the convoy and 47 of them are 
uncontrollable. Controllable factors include the HVU and screen ship properties. 
Uncontrollable factors relate to enemy ship properties. 
 xxiii
The AAW Analysis Model was first analyzed across both uncontrollable 
and controllable factors to explore what the convoy can do and the enemy 
specifications that have the greatest effect on HVU survival. Subsequently, the 
outputs were analyzed over only the controllable factors in a robust analysis to 
identify the actions the convoy can take that are effective across a breadth of 
threat capabilities and tactics. The analysis determined that the anti-ship missile 
(ASM) specifications of enemy ships, the surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
specifications of the screen ships, and the HVU’s staying power have the most 
significant effect on HVU survivability. 
This study is just a first step in using the AAW Analysis Model to explore 
and enhance the safety of NATO ships in convoy operations where an air threat 
is possible. Further developments and modifications are needed for other types 
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Anti-air warfare (AAW) is one of the primary aspects of naval warfare. 
Since the invention of mid and long-range missiles, missile usage and defense 
has been an important element in determining the outcome of naval wars. For 
instance, in the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina, the 
use of French-made Exocet missiles greatly impacted the war. In fact, the United 
Kingdom made an agreement with France to stop Argentina from acquiring more 
Exocets. Before that agreement, Exocet missiles previously obtained by the 
Argentinian Military were used to put the HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor 
out of action. 
In naval warfare, especially for control of a sea area, there are three 
primary types of warfare that squadrons and task forces have to be aware of: 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), AAW, and surface warfare (SW). ASW is outside 
of the scope of this study. SW is primarily based on anti-ship missiles (ASMs), 
which force warships to conduct AAW tactics and concepts to survive in an 
operational area. AAW and SW mostly depend on the sensors and close combat 
weapons that a warship has.  
The quantity, availability, and capability of long and mid-range anti-ship 
missiles may pose a significant threat to NATO forces. Current anti-air missile 
tactics need to be developed further, and their future effectiveness is open to 
discussion (Townsend, 1999). Further scientific analysis of such tactics and 
systems is necessary using appropriate methods and tools. However, current 
combat analysis tools for naval anti-air warfare tactics have limited scope. They 
do not provide analysis equipment to comprehensively compare different tactics 
in AAW. Additionally, they mostly focus on single ship scenarios that are 
uncommon in AAW. Some naval combat models focus on the effects of formation 
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movement. Nevertheless, their work does not fully evaluate the effect of enemy 
surface assets. Instead, they primarily focus on ASM raids. 
B. BACKGROUND 
AAW’s purpose in naval operations may be defending a squadron or High 
Value Unit (HVU) from air threats. Air threats may be, but are not limited to, 
fighter airplanes or warships with anti-ship missiles (ASMs). AAW is also 
necessary to provide a protection for forces conducting naval convoy operations 
(O’Neil, 1981). These convoy operations include naval support for protection of 
commercial ships, amphibious forces, carrier task forces, and logistic carriers. 
The first countermeasure against airstrikes consisted of mounting 
antiaircraft guns on ships. By the end of World War I, most of the important ships 
had a battery of one to four semiautomatic guns in high angle mountings, 
supplemented by machine guns. The machine guns were simple. The pilots fired 
them with simple computations without considering any factors that can increase 
accuracy, which is why they rarely hit their target (O'Neil, 1981). However, with 
the advance in technology, counter measures against airstrikes have become 
modernized. In contemporary naval warfare, modern combat ships and combat 
air patrols with fighter airplanes provide air defense for task forces with state-of-
the-art weapons, such as modern guns and missiles. For instance, an aircraft 
carrier's combat air patrol is the most effective defense against enemy aircraft. 
Nevertheless, the screen ships that consist of frigates and destroyers can also 
provide a formidable defense against air threats.  
Especially within a carrier group, air defense in naval tactics is often 
provided with layered defense tactics. At the center of these concentric layers, an 
aircraft carrier or other HVU is protected. A carrier strike group is shown in Figure 
1. The outer layer usually consists of an airborne early warning and control 
system and combat air patrol that are composed of the fighter aircraft carried by 
the aircraft carrier. If an enemy force—which may be either an aircraft or a 
missile—gets into the air defense umbrella from this layer, then the next layers of 
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defense are provided by aircraft based on the aircraft carrier that escorts the 
naval task force. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are launched from surface 
platforms, such as the Standard Missile-1 (SM-1), with a range of up to 100 nm, 
and gun systems like 76 mm Oto Melara gun, with a range of up to 30 nm, 
provide point defense. As a last layer, a frigate or destroyer will usually be 
mounted with guns, including a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) such as Sea-
Zenith or Phalanx. A CIWS is a type of Gatling gun that can fire thousands of 
rounds in a minute. The calibers of those rounds are usually between 20 mm and 
30 mm.  
  
Figure 1.  A Carrier Strike Group with Layers of Defense.  
Source: (U.S.Navy, n.d.). 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The primary goal of this study is building a flexible, scalable, and 
expandable simulation model of naval AAW. This tool can also be used as a 
decision support tool to help decide which missiles or close combat weapons 
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should be on particular types of combat ships. This model will also be a valuable 
tool for exploring AAW tactics. The primary objectives of this research are: 
 Building a flexible, scalable, expandable, and well documented 
AAW Analysis Model using DES methodology and the Java Simkit 
Library. 
 Designing, running, and analyzing the outputs of simulation 
experiments for particular scenarios in a proof of concept 
demonstration of the potential utility of the model in studying AAW 
capabilities and tactics. This analysis will also serve as a first step 
in the validation process of the model. 
 Providing the base model for follow on constructive simulations.  
 Providing a basis for follow-on research studies, especially for 
layered defense tactics in naval AAW and formation movement 
implementation using Java Simkit Library. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Which DES components should be used to build an AAW ship 
defense model for analyzing AAW capabilities in terms of sensors 
and weapons? 
2. Which analysis methods can be utilized to efficiently conduct 
simulation analysis? 
3. What are the most effective factors in AAW ship design and AAW? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Models are used to approximate real systems. This study focuses on 
models of ships and their sensors and weapons. To model all these objects and 
their interactions in a DES, some assumptions have been made and some 
approximations have been used, such as the probability of the kill of an ASM 
when used against a ship or the probability of kill of a SAM when it is used 
against an ASM. To obtain the exact inputs and real data for that information was 
impossible because of the delicate nature of classified data clearance needs. 
The models studied in this thesis are highly dependent on the data used as input 
parameters. Because real classified data was not available, the model was run 
many times over a range of input parameters. As a part of this objective, the 
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effects of these input changes on the outputs are analyzed and documented, as 
will be explained in the following chapters. The flow of this research is: 
1. Determine the simulation model’s inputs, output requirements, 
events, and event details. 
2. Identify the simulation event components needed to model and 
specify the events for these components.  
3. Creation of code for the events and components needed for the 
model.  
4. Testing the model in various simple single ship scenarios.  
5. Experiment with the model on the convoy scenarios using state-of-
the-art design of experiments techniques. 
6. Conduct an analysis of the simulation’s outputs using suitable 
statistical tools. 
F. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This study is limited to an analysis of ship air defense. The ships and the 
missile properties analyzed approximate real life. All of the data used as input 
parameters are taken from unclassified open sources. The scope of this thesis is 
limited to following: 
1. Usage of Simkit to create various combat scenarios, objects, and 
events; 
2. Analyzing the effectiveness of sensors, missiles, and combat ships 
for naval air defense with ship self-defense tactics;  
3. The conclusions are based on the simulation results and subject to 
all model limitations.  
G. OUTLINE 
1. Introduction 
The problem statement and tool (Simkit) is introduced. A brief explanation 
of the background and methods is made. The scope of the thesis, research 
questions, and thesis objectives are also in this chapter. 
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2. Simple Movement and Detection in Discrete Event Simulation 
Using Simkit Library and Literature Review 
The mechanics of DES are mentioned in this chapter. How DES can be 
used for modeling simple movement and detection using the Simkit library are 
the body parts of this chapter. The most important point of the chapter is the 
examination of what studies previously have been done, which is the literature 
review.  
3. Design of AAW Analysis Model  
This chapter explains how the AAW Analysis Model is designed, how the 
model works, what the components of the model are, what the assumptions of 
the model are, and the strengths and weaknesses of the designed model.  
4. Analysis of Model and Results  
The fourth chapter presents how the analysis is made, how the 
experiment is designed, what design methods are used, the measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs), design points, and 
the results of the analysis.  
5. Conclusions and Future Work  
This chapter provides a general overview of how the study has been 
conducted, the results of the analysis, the insights gained from the study, and 
what can be done to improve the model.  
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 SIMPLE MOVEMENT AND DETECTION II.
A. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION 
DES is a methodology based on the execution sequence of events at 
particular times (Law & Kelton, 1991). Each event defined in the simulation 
occurs at a specific time and an event list keeps track of each event. After an 
occurrence, an event may or may not schedule another event with a time delay, 
which can be zero. All these events are stored in a single event list sorted by 
scheduled time. There are three main elements of DES, they are: 
1. States 
2. Events 
3. Scheduling relationships between events 
According to Buss (2011), states can be defined as follows: “[a] state 
variable in a DES model is one that has a possibility of changing value at least 
once during any given simulation run. The collection of all state variables for a 
given DES model should give a complete description of the simulation model at 
any point in time” (p. 1). 
According to Buss (2011), an event can change none, a few, or many 
state variables, as stated above. Each state transition is a mapping from a 
model’s state space into itself. For each possible state transition, an event is 
defined. 
Buss (2011) explained the next event algorithm by this definition: “The 
method of time advance in DES models is termed next event. Rather than 
advancing time in a regular, consistent manner, simulation time moves in 
typically unequal increments, jumping from the scheduled time of one event to 
another; thus, the term Next Event” (p. 3). The next event algorithm is shown in 




Next Event Algorithm shows how the DES methodology and algorithm works. 
Figure 2.  Next Event Algorithm. Source: Buss (2011). 
According to Buss (2011), a second type of variable is called a simulation 
parameter. Simulation parameters do not change during a simulation run. The 
AAW Analysis Model has many parameters and the model is analyzed by 
systematically varying those parameters.  
A simulation run may be terminated in several ways. One of these is 
ending the simulation run after some specified amount of time has passed. 
Another way is based on how many times a particular event occurs. For the AAW 
Analysis Model, the second way is utilized, because the simulation will not 
always end at a particular time. The simulation run time may differ according to 
specific scenarios and parameters of objects. 
Defining a DES model requires the definition of state variables, 
parameters, and events by specifying state transitions, assigning a unique name 
to that event, and defining scheduling relationships between events. 
DES and its approach to modeling mechanics have particular advantages 
compared to those of time stepped models. Especially for combat scenarios 
generation, even the execution time of the source code may cause drastic 
 9
differences in outputs. In a time stepped model, even the size of time step may 
significantly affect the results of a simulation (Al Rowaei, 2011). Particularly, for 
constructive simulations, the purpose is running the model with different 
combinations of parameters. Additionally, for each set of parameters we desire to 
have a moderate amount of replication depending on the size of simulation. In 
constructive simulations in which our purpose is analysis of outputs, results that 
are dependent on time steps can be very misleading. On the contrary, in an 
event based model, this is less of a concern.  
B. BASIC EVENT GRAPH MODELING 
In the basic DES framework, scheduling events reflects a binary 
relationship between events being processed and events being scheduled. In 
other words, knowing which event is being processed allows us to have 
information about whether an event will be scheduled. Thus, the representation 
of a framework and the interactions between events is possible by using event 
graphs in DES (Buss, 2011).  
An event graph is comprised of nodes that represent events and directed 
edges that correspond to the scheduling of other events. Edges may or may not 
have Boolean conditions that are related to scheduling the next event with an 
appropriate time delay. In other words, if an edge in an event graph has a 
condition, the processed event schedules the next event according to the 
Boolean value of that condition.  
The fundamental construct for event graphs is shown in Figure 3. 
According to Scruben (1983), the construct is interpreted as follows:  
After Event A occurred, it schedules Event B after time delay of t, 
provided condition (i) is true. Condition (i) is evaluated after all the 
state transitions and necessary calculations are performed in event 
A. Conventionally, the indication of time delay t is made toward the 
tail of scheduling edge, and the condition related to that scheduling 
edge is demonstrated just above the wavy line that is in the middle 
of the scheduling edge. If the time delay is zero (no time delay), 
then t is omitted. In the same manner, if Event B is always 
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scheduled after the occurrence of Event A, then the edge condition 
is omitted. So, the basic event graph framework consists of two 
elements: the event node and the scheduling edge, with options of 
time delay and edge condition. (p. 983)  
 
Figure 3.  Fundamental Event Graph Construct. Source: Scruben (1983).  
Event graphs are critical for making the relationships between events clear 
and easily understood. A complete event graph model consists of parameters, 
state variables, event vertices, scheduling edges, and state transition logic. 
C. SIMKIT 
Simkit (Buss, 2016) is a Java Library designed and developed by Prof. 
Arnold H. Buss to implement DES. Implementing DES is usually complicated, 
and commercial software packages typically lack the flexibility that the AAW 
Analysis Model requires. Specifically, modeling movement, sensing, and 
weapons interactions are difficult with most commercial software. However, the 
Simkit library provides a modeler with an intermediate level of knowledge and 
skills in the Java programming language the ability to model a wide range of 
applications, including inventory models, queue models, transfer line models, and 
combat models. Additionally, it has its own built in statistics class. That’s why, for 
the purposes of this work, Simkit is the most appropriate tool. 
D. SIMPLE MOVEMENT AND DETECTION IN DISCRETE EVENT 
SIMULATION 
Entity locations often play the most impactful role in simulation models. 
However, a time stepped approach has been typically preferred over an event 
stepped approach to model entity movements, because it has been perceived as 
more intuitive compared to a movement that is modeled by discrete event 
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simulation. Nevertheless, the time stepped approach has inherent modeling 
difficulties, artifacts, and limitations. In contrast, modeling movement in a DES 
approach has many advantages. Buss and Sanchez (2005) define movement in 
DES as follows:  
At first glance, modeling movement seems to present a challenge 
to the discrete event approach, since the state of an entity in motion 
(its location, for instance) is in constant change when an entity is in 
motion. This difficulty is overcome by the notion of implicit state. An 
implicit state is one that is not explicitly stored in state variables 
(instance variables in an object-oriented framework) but rather can 
be implicitly determined from other state variables. An entity that 
moves in uniform, linear motion can have its position modeled by 
implicit state in that its position is not stored as an instance variable 
but is computed “on demand”. The implicit state of position is 
determined from three explicit state variables: the entity’s position 
when it started to move, the time it started to move, and its velocity 
vector. (p. 992)  
Instead, time is incremented as the events are being processed. When the 
event happens, first the state variables are changed; then event cancellations, if 
they occur, are processed; and lastly, further events are scheduled. The state 
variables do not change in between the events (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). Buss 
and Sanchez (2005) explain linear uniform motion as follows: “The simplest 
possible movement is a linear uniform motion. An entity starts its movement at an 
initial position x 	 at time 0t 	 and begins moving with velocity v . Its equation of 
motion is	 x ൅	ሺ t‐ 0t ሻ v , which describes the entities location at time t“ (p. 992). 
In a DES model, the locations of moving entities are modeled in implicit 
states, and the movement is uniform and linear, so the location can be easily 
calculated by dead reckoning using the initial position, velocity vector, and the 
time it started to move, as mentioned above. The equations of motion explained 
in the previous paragraph are calculated in base coordinates. Mostly, we need to 
calculate the location and movement of an entity relative to a particular entity. 
However, this case is also not hard to represent, because the location of an 
entity can be calculated with respect to the reference entity and by translating the 
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base coordinate system. After those calculations, the relative velocity is equally 
trivial as in uniform linear motion. Buss and Sanchez (2005) explain relative 
velocity as follows:  
The coordinates and velocities of the entities are all in some 
common base coordinate system, so the motion represented above 
can be considered absolute motion in the base coordinates. Often it 
is desirable to consider location and motion relative to some 
particular entity’s coordinates. In that case, the locations and 
velocities can be represented relative to that entity’s coordinates. 
For most purposes the entities’ coordinate systems may be 
considered to be simply a translation of the base coordinate 
system. Thus, an entity at position y in base coordinates is at 
position y−x in the coordinates of an entity located at position x in 
the base coordinate system. Relative velocity is equally simple for 
uniform linear motion. Suppose the equations of motion for two 
entities are given by i ix tv , (i 1,2) . Then in the coordinate 
system of entity 1, the motion of entity 2 is given by 
2 1 2 1( ) t( )x x v v   . Thus, relative to the first entity, the motion of the 
second is uniform and linear with starting position 2 1( )x x  and 
velocity 2 1( )v v . (p. 993)  
According to Buss and Sanchez (2005), detection of a moving entity in 
DES is also possible for modeling radars. The most basic detection is the cookie-
cutter sensor. A cookie-cutter sensor detects a target with probability 1.0 when 
the target enters the range (R) of the sensor and loses contact with the target 
when it gets out of the range of the sensor. So, the question is determining the 
times that these events are going to occur, which we can call detection and 
contact loss. The equations of motion for an entity are defined above. According 
to these equations of motion, the location of a target at a time of detection can be 
determined as x tv . 
Detection occurs when the distance between the target and the sensor is 
exactly R. We need to determine time t  by solving the Equation 3.1 (Buss & 
Sanchez, 2005):  
 .x tv R     (3.1) 
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The detection time is the result of t  when the Equation 3.2 is solved (Buss 
& Sanchez, 2005):  
 2 22 22(x.v) tv t x R   .  (3.2) 
 Here “.” represents the vector inner product and  represents the length 
of the vector. The solutions of Equation 3.2 can be calculated with Equation 3.3 




(R ) ( . ). v x x vx vt
v v
    .  (3.3) 
This equation has 4 possible results depending on the roots: 
1. Both real positive: The solutions in Equation 3.3 may both be 
positive real numbers. In that case, the target starts out of the 
range of the sensor and is eventually detected. The minimum of the 
solutions is the detection time and the maximum is the exit time (A).  
2. One positive and one negative root: In this case, the target is 
already inside the range of the sensor, and the positive root gives 
the time that the target is going to exit the range (B). 
3. Both roots negative: The target is outside of the sensor range and 
is moving away from the sensor. At some time in the past, the 
target passed through the range of the sensor. However, it is never 
going to enter the sensor range (C).  
4. No real roots: The target never enters the sensor range (D).  
All of the cases that are explained above can be seen in Figure 4.  
The times that are calculated from the expressions can be used to 
schedule entry and exit times inside the sensor’s range. These times are suitable 
to schedule events in a DES, since events are scheduled with a time delay. 
These relative times are better for scheduling the event with time delays. 
The defined “Enter Range” and “Exit Range” events trigger the “Detection” 
and “Undetection” events for a sensor. For the cookie-cutter case, the “Detection” 
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and “Undetection” events are scheduled with zero time delay, as expected in the 
simplest case.  
 
Figure 4.  Cookie Cutter Detection: All Possibilities.  
Source: Buss and Sanchez (2005). 
Another approach that is more complex compared to the cookie cutter 
approach can be explained as constant rate detection. Since the target is in the 
range of the sensor, it is going to be detected with a probability of p  at every t  
time unit as long as it is inside the sensor’s range. Buss and Sanchez (2005) 
elaborate the constant rate approach as follows:  
Converting this simple approach to a DES application depends on 
the probability distribution of the time between the “Enter Range” 
and “Exit Range” events. The detection attempts after the target is 
inside the range are Bernoulli trials with identical probabilities. 
Thus, the number N detection attempts until the first detection can 
be explained as a geometric random variable with probability p. The 
time to detection is N× t , where N is a geometric random variable 
with parameter p. The DES formulation requires two parameters, 
which are t  and p. The Geometric distribution can be simplified as 
an exponential random variable with mean  = t /p. (p. 995) 
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1. Implementation Approach 
The Simkit Library (Buss, 2016) is a Java-based library that supports 
creating component-based DES models. As mentioned earlier, event graphs 
describe the state transitions, scheduling, and cancelling relationships between 
events. Event graphs are directed graphs in which each node specifies an event 
and state transitions for that event. Each directed arc demonstrates the 
relationships between events. Connections between components can be made 
using listener patterns and “LEGO” connections (Buss & Sanchez, 2002). 
2. Mover Component 
The Mover component is based on the equations of motion that are 
mentioned earlier. The most important idea about all these implementations is, in 
DES, events are scheduled at the times when an entity changes its position or 
state. On the contrary, in a time stepped approach, the entity’s state is always 
updated at each time step (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). 
An entity’s location cannot be a part of the state of a moving entity, since 
in DES a state can only be changed when an event occurs (Buss & Sanchez, 
2005). Initial conditions remain fixed throughout a given movement. These values 
can be defined asሺݔ଴, ݒ, ݐ଴ሻ, which are initial location, velocity and the starting 
time for movement, which are the state variables of a basic linear mover. These 
state variables can be modified or more state variables may be added for more 
complex movement equations or more complex movers. An event graph for a 
mover component can be shown as below. 
 
A mover can be defined as any entity that has the capability of movement in a 
simulation. 
Figure 5.  Mover Event Graph. Source: Buss and Sanchez (2005). 
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Maximum speed is among the parameters of a mover component. The 
most basic command that can be given to a mover component is to move to a 
determined position at the best speed. This causes the “Start Move” event to be 
triggered and velocity and movement time is calculated as seen on the event 
graph in Figure 5 (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). The current location of the event, the 
current simulation time and the velocity are used as state variables, and they are 
updated according to events. Velocity is obtained by calculating the vector 
difference between the current location and destination, normalizing and scaling 
that unit vector by speed. At the end, the “End Move” event is scheduled with an 
appropriate time delay. The “End Move” event sets the mover’s current location 
to destination and velocity to zero. 
3. Sensor Component 
The sensor component has two functional goals. One is keeping the list of 
detected contacts and the other is holding the parameters needed for the 
detection algorithm. So, it has only “Detection” and “Undetection” events. The 
event graph of a sensor component is seen in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Sensor Event Graph. Source: Buss and Sanchez (2005) 
As seen in Figure 6, no scheduling arcs appear in the sensor event graph. 
Since it does not schedule any event itself, these events are scheduled by 
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another component named the mediator, which is described later. A detection 
algorithm is implemented by mediators, not by sensors. 
Simkit implements a “Sim Event Listener Pattern” (Buss & Sanchez, 
2002). Simulation components that are interested in other events which are 
inside another component are registered as Sim Event Listeners. Whenever a 
simulation event occurs at the listened component―after making all the state 
transitions and scheduling the necessary events―listeners are notified. Inside a 
listener component, events with the same names and arguments are executed.  
4. Referee Component 
While a target’s range to sensor is more than a sensor’s range, a sensor-
target interaction is not possible. However, when the target enters the maximum 
range of the sensor, detection is possible. Likewise, after a target exits the 
maximum range of the sensor, interactions between target and sensor no longer 
matter. Determining when the events “Enter Range” and “Exit Range” are going 
to occur is the responsibility of a referee component by using the equations of 
motion that are shown above. A different component has to be used because 
having the “Ground Truth” data available must not be possible for both the 
sensor and the mover. A referee keeps a mover-sensor list to detect these 
movers, listens for “StartMove” and “EndMove” events as seen in Figure 6, and 
makes necessary calculations according to the equations of motion to determine 
whether an “Enter Range” or “Exit Range” occurs (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). It 
also calculates the time delay for “Enter Range” and “Exit Range” events.  
In Figure 7, each scheduling edge also has a cancelling edge (Buss & 
Sanchez, 2005). These cancelling edges are not shown in the event graph to be 
clearer. The condition (a) is true if the target is outside the sensor range and it is 
going to enter inside sensor range after ݐଵ units of time and condition (b) is true if 
the target is inside the sensor’s range and it is going to exit sensor range after	ݐଶ 
units of time. Another important aspect not shown in Figure 7 is all “Start Move,” 
 18
“Enter Range,” and “Exit Range” events have two arguments, one of which is 
Sensor and the other is Mover. 
 
Figure 7.  Referee Event Graph Listening to Mover.  
Source: Buss and Sanchez (2005). 
5. Sensor Mover Mediators  
This component’s purpose is the same as the referee (Buss & Sanchez, 
2005). Because, it is not possible for a mover and sensor to have the “Ground 
Truth” information, “Detection” and “Undetection” events are scheduled by the 
mediator component. Usage of this component also helps us have the chance of 
implementing all kinds of detection algorithms. Adding these events and making 
these calculations with the referee would force us re-write a different referee 
class any time a new detection algorithm is added. The event graph for the 
mediator is shown in Figure 8.  
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An instance of mediator listens to the referee for “Enter Range” and “Exit Range” 
events. 
Figure 8.  Mediator Event Graph. Source: Buss and Sanchez (2005). 
An “Enter Range” event calculates the time until detection and schedules 
a “Detection” event (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). A “Detection” event schedules an 
“Undetection” event by calculating the time until “Undetection.” An “Exit Range” 
will be heard by the referee to cancel all the pending “Detection” and 
“Undetection” events on the event list and schedule an “Undetection” 
immediately. As it is implemented in Referee, signatures for “EnterRange” and 
“ExitRange” events are the mover and the sensor. So, these events have 
parameters and state variables for these objects. Each detection algorithm is 
going to have a separate Mediator class that implements this. An “EnterRange” 
event is responsible for scheduling a “Detection” event according to its sensor 
type using the detection algorithm it is implementing. Detection times are typically 
calculated using the parameters and state variables that a sensor has. For a 
Cookie Cutter sensor, the time until detection is always 0.0. For the constant rate 
detection algorithm described above, the mediator generates random 
Exponential Random Variables and multiplies this by the mean time to detection 
to calculate the time to detection and schedule the “Detection” event. More 
complicated sensor detection models can also be generated and used according 
to the requirements of the model.  
 20
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large amount of work, studies, papers, and theses relate to AAW. 
However, most of them are not related to the specific task of building a Discrete 
Event Simulation Tool for a complete analysis of AAW. Among all of them, the 
ones highlighted below contributed significantly toward that goal.  
Kulac built an analysis tool whose purpose is “to make a comparative 
analysis of active and passive sensors in AAW defense using DES components” 
(Kulac, 1999). He developed an analysis tool to measure to measure the 
effectiveness of infrared and radar Sensors in AAW. He used a component-
based simulation approach similar to the one used in this report. His tool was 
scalable and flexible. Additionally, he statistically analyzed different MOEs. 
However, in his study, he only focused on the sensors and two primary classes 
of weapons. These were ASMs and SAMs. Nevertheless, modern warships are 
such complex systems that their AAW capabilities are not limited to that extent. 
Inclusion of a layered defense capability for a warship in AAW is crucial. The 
other issue his report neglected was formation movement and defense tactics at 
a naval task group level. He mostly focused on a single ship’s self-defense. 
That’s why his model’s fidelity was limited. On the other hand, he provided a 
good study given that the Simkit library was so new at that time. Since then, 
there have been many improvements to Simkit.  
Aydin modeled the screen dispositions of naval task forces (Aydin, 2000). 
He also built a tool and graphical user interface for ship defense in convoy 
operations. In his model, he used a Disposition Mission Model (DMM) to perform 
an effective defensive disposition from a task force. He focused on the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) to provide a user friendly environment for analyzing new 
tactics and formations. He modeled two dispositions for AAW defense against 
particular types of ASM missiles. These dispositions were Screen Disposition 
and Disposition 2W. He studied the effects of the disposition of naval units on the 
defense of a High Value Unit in a convoy operation. In his model, he spawned 
ASM missiles from particular threat sectors toward a convoy and checked 
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whether the convoy had succeeded in the defense of HVU. Then, he made a 
logistic regression to check which factors were effective. He considered the 
ranges of missiles, the axis of movement, the position of the threat sector, the 
number of ships, the number missiles, and the number of ships on the threat 
sector. Nevertheless, his model lacked the fidelity of the engaging unit that sent 
the ASMs to the convoy and ship’s layered defense models. 
Turan developed a simulation that provided “suitable Operations Research 
analytical techniques and tools to aid decision authorities in the Ship Self Air 
Defense (SSAD) system selection process” (Turan, 2002). He used DES 
techniques and implemented them in the Java Programming Language and 
Modkit. Then, he used his simulation to analyze two different SSAD systems and 
firing policies. He defined the key parameters as number of trackers, SAM 
inventory levels, and slew delay. He made a comparative analysis of Shoot-Look-
Shoot and Shoot-Shoot-Look policies in fire control systems and Active and 
Semi-Active ship self-defense systems. As a result of the success of his SSAD 
simulation, using the success criteria as no leak to the ship, he made 
recommendations for further component additions and modifications. In his 
model, he did not take the layered defense policy into consideration and did not 
model the gun and CIWS of a ship. These weapon systems play a crucial role in 
AAW. Furthermore, he only focused on a single ship’s self-defense policy.  
Townsend—in his report about the defense of Naval Task Forces from an 
ASM attack—developed an analysis tool called ASM Defense Model (Townsend, 
1999). The model allowed for an analysis of entire task force by modeling ASMs’ 
target selection and escort ships’ protection of HVU by defensive fire. He studied 
an effective screen design and defensive firing policy. He created a mathematical 
library to solve various equations of motion. The model he built could also 
evaluate missile attacks from different angles and the impact of a decoy if it were 
developed. He suggested this subject for a future study. He also used the Simkit 
and Modkit libraries in the Java Programming Language. However, his work was 
solely focused on ASM raids, and he also did not consider including a layered 
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defense policy. The only objects he had in the simulation were ASMs, ships and 
SAMs.  
No studies have been found of a complete analysis of complex AAW 
scenarios with formation movement models and ship layered defense models 
with SAMs, guns, and CIWS, so no tools comprehensively assess AAW in a 
naval operational area. Because of the insufficiencies and artifacts of the tools 
that are built, a new tool for a complete analysis of AAW was required. A 
statistical study of model output with many factors explored is conducted, as will 







 DESIGN OF AAW ANALYSIS MODEL III.
This chapter describes the AAW Analysis Model, which is a stochastic 
DES model. The AAW Analysis Model was developed to investigate the most 
effective factors for the protection of a High Value Asset in convoy operations. 
Two types of ships are modeled inside the AAW analysis model: a High Value 
Unit (HVU) and frigates. Analysis inside the AAW Analysis Model is based on a 
primary scenario of the HVU’s protection by friendly frigates against enemy 
frigates. The HVU and all the frigates have specific starting locations according to 
the scale of the Simkit smd library, which uses a two dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system. The HVU has a predefined path for each scenario and the 
simulation run will terminate according to the given condition of either the HVU’s 
destruction or the HVU reaching the last waypoint of its predefined path. Each 
frigate that represents enemy ships also has predefined paths. These enemy 
frigates patrol on those predefined paths. Each friendly frigate of the HVU has a 
starting position close to the HVU. Each of these frigates takes their positions 
according to the relative offset angle and offset distance in the screen formation. 
Friendly frigates protecting the HVU move by keeping their relative distance and 
offset angle from the HVU. Their goal is the protection of the HVU by either 
engaging enemy ships or destroying the ASMs that are sent from enemy ships 
against either themselves or the HVU. One possible scenario consists of three 
Blue frigates, one HVU, and two enemy ships, as seen in Figure 9. 
The threat axis at the starting conditions of the simulation is seen in the 
Figure 9. However, that axis is subject to change due to the movement of units. 
Actually, there may be a 360 degrees threat against the HVU and Blue ships. 
Incoming threats are eliminated by ships according to a layered defense policy. 
After the detection of an incoming air threat (particularly a missile), soft kill 
methods like Electronic Warfare and decoys are conducted when the threat 
reaches a specified distance from the units. Then, AAW defense ships first 
engage with their surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to eliminate the incoming anti-
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ship missiles (ASMs). If some ASMs are not eliminated, then the defensive ships 
engage with their guns, and if still not eliminated they use a last decoy to attempt 
to deceive the incoming ASMs, and finally they engage with their CIWS. Air 
threats may also stem from airplanes. However, neither airplanes nor soft kill 
methods are currently modeled in the AAW Analysis Model. Thus, air threats that 
are detected and engaged with a layered defense policy can only be ASMs, and 
they will be destroyed by only the hard kill methods that are mentioned above in 
the layered defense tactics. Thus, ASMs can only be launched from ships.  
 
Figure 9.  Possible Scenario for AAW Analysis Model. 
In Figure 10, concentric circles represent each ship’s sensor ranges. A 
blue circle is a ship’s surveillance sensor range. Inside this range, an entity can 
be detected and classified by ships. A red circle represents SAM engagement 
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sensor range for a ship. Inside that range, ships engage an incoming ASM with a 
SAM. A yellow circle represents gun engagement range. Inside that range, ships 
engage their targets with its gun. A black circle represents CIWS engagement 
sensor. Inside that range, ships engage their targets with CIWS. Red ships 
(enemy ships), which are the ones at the left most top corner and right most 
bottom corner, and screen ships, which are located around the HVU in the 
middle of the figure, have a surveillance sensor, SAM engagement sensor, gun 
engagement sensor, and CIWS engagement sensor. HVU has only a 
surveillance sensor and CIWS engagement sensor. An orange square 
represents an ASM; a blue square represents a SAM; a red square represents a 
gun round, and a black square represents a CIWS round. 
 
Figure 10.  Demonstration of the AAW Analysis Model. 
Ships may engage each other with their ASMs and guns if they are inside 
ranges of their corresponding weapons. A ship may be hit by an ASM if that 
particular one leaks from the layered defense and successfully hits a ship. A ship 
being hit by a gun depends only on a successful hit, with two conditions:  
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 Sending the weapon to a location that is close enough to cause an 
impact for a ship.  
 Successfully damaging the ship.  
An ASM can be eliminated if a SAM, gun round or CIWS round gets close 
enough for impact and successfully damages the ASM. So, inside AAW Analysis 
Model, five types of engagements may occur among weapons or ships:  
 ASM (launched by enemy ship)-ship engagement  
 Gun round (fired by enemy ship)-ship engagement  
 ASM-SAM (launched by opposing units) engagement  
 ASM-gun round (launched/fired by opposing units) engagement 
 ASM-CIWS (launched/fired by opposing units) engagement  
All the actions a ship can take depend on its capabilities. In the AAW 
Analysis Model, a ship has the capability to detect enemy units or the ASMs 
launched from enemy units with its surveillance radar, classifying them correctly, 
and engaging them with appropriate weapons. A frigate can have ASMs, SAMs, 
guns and CIWS in the AAW Analysis Model. However, even though it may be 
modified later, currently an HVU can only have a CIWS for the scenarios to be 
analyzed. SAMs and CIWS are not considered to be threats against ships; 
rather, they are primarily defensive weapons.  
The ship self-defense and attack system that is developed inside the AAW 




4. Missile mover manager 
5. Follower mover manager 
6. HVU mover manager 
7. Gun round 
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8. Round mover manager 
9. Ship surveillance sensor 
10. Ship sensor for SAM engagement 
11. Ship sensor for Gun engagement  
12. Ship sensor for CIWS engagement 
13. Contact  
14. Policy  
15. Adjudicator 
Among those components, the ship surveillance sensor, the ASM, the 
SAM, the gun round, the contact, and the adjudicator are stochastic ones. The 
ship surveillance sensor is a constant rate sensor. A “Detection” event inside the 
ship surveillance sensor is scheduled according to an exponential distribution 
whose rate is determined by user. The ASM, the SAM, the gun round 
components have their own damage functions. Their damage functions return 
damage amounts if an ASM, a SAM, or a gun round successfully hit their targets. 
The damage amounts come from a truncated normal distribution. The 
parameters of those damage functions are among parameters of the AAW 
Analysis Model. A contact component creates distortion for each sensor’s 
detection. This distortion comes from a rotated bivariate normal distribution 
whose parameters are also among the AAW Analysis Model factors. The 
adjudicator component has user defined probability distributions for each type of 
engagement. 
A. SHIP 
A ship is the main object of the simulation. A ship object is designed by 
extending the Basic Linear Mover class in Simkit. The ship object is designed 
such that any type of ship can be instantiated using that single class. It has its 
own methods for launching its missiles, or firing its guns, if it has any. For 
instance, if ship is an HVU, such as an aircraft carrier or a tanker, it can only 
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have CIWS. On the other hand, a ship can be instantiated with any type of 
weapon and sensor combination provided we have sufficient data for sensor and 
weapon ranges, missile speeds, gun or missile inter shoot/launch delays, or even 
the detection rate of the sensor. All kinds of sensors are parts of the ship object. 
A ship listens to its sensors for any kind of detection.  
A ship object’s Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram and event 
graph are seen in Figure 13 and Figure 11, respectively. For the simulation to 
execute properly, all the “Sim Event Listener Patterns” should be instantiated 
before each simulation run. General “Sim Event Listener Pattern” for the AAW 
Analysis Model is shown in Figure 12. If an object is destroyed, the sim event 
listeners from it are removed. All the objects that are listening to it stop listening.  
B. ANTI-SHIP MISSILE  
ASM is the component with the properties and state variables shown in 
the UML diagram (see Figure 14). It is designed as an object in the simulation. It 
has alive, engaged, and destroyed states. After it has been instantiated and sent 
toward the target, it enters an engaged state. After impact, it enters a destroyed 
state, regardless of the result of the impact. The ASM uses the missile mover 
manager for its movements. When the ASM is launched, it gets its target as a 
parameter during instantiation and it attacks toward the target.  
ASM is a munition type in the AAW Analysis Model. All ASMs are 
instantiated inside an ASM pool list for each ship at the very beginning of 
simulation runs. These ASMs inside the ASM pool are used for all simulation 
runs. In each simulation run, ASMs are popped from the ASM pool list and 
inserted in a launched ASM list in “Launch ASM” event when the ships engage 
with theirs ASMs. After the simulation is reset for another run, all ASMs in both 
the ASM pool list and the launched ASM list are reset. Then, launched ASMs are 
popped from launched ASM list and inserted back to the ASM pool list of that 
ship. In that way, the ASM pool list and the launched ASM list return to the 
original states. This methodology is used to optimize the code and execution 
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speed. Since the ASMs are dynamically used at each ASM engagement, 
instantiating them at each engagement without using the pooling methodology 
causes an unused memory leak and slows down the simulation. The ASM 




Figure 11.  Ship Event Graph. 
 31
 
Figure 12.  General Sim Event Listener Pattern for AAW Analysis Model. 
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Figure 13.  Ship UML Diagram. 
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Figure 14.  ASM Component UML Diagram. 
 
Figure 15.  ASM Component Event Graph. 
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C. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE  
SAM is the component that is used at one of the ship self-defense layers, 
when triggered by the ship sensor for SAM engagement. It uses the missile 
mover manager as an ASM. SAM is an object similar to ASM. It moves according 
to the target that is defined at its mover manager at instantiation. It is instantiated 
dynamically with pooling methodology at the engagement event, like an ASM. 
SAMs are launched and reset with the same methodology used in ASM 
engagements. The SAM component UML diagram is shown in Figure 16, and the 
SAM component UML diagram is shown in Figure 17. 
 






Figure 17.  SAM Component Event Graph. 
D. MISSILE MOVER MANAGER  
The missile mover manager is a special mover manager that is designed 
for the movement of guided missiles. As seen in its event graph, the missile 
mover manager calculates a new interception when the route of its target 
changes. So, it guides its mover toward its target. It has a parameter that defines 
the impact distance. The missile mover manager UML diagram is shown in 
Figure 18, and the missile mover manager event graph is shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 18.  Missile Mover Manager UML Diagram. 
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Figure 19.  Missile Mover Manager Event Graph. 
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E. FOLLOWER MOVER MANAGER 
The follower mover manager is the mover manager responsible for 
movement of the screen ships according to a guide. The follower mover manager 
calculates the position of a screen ship according to a relative distance and angle 
from its guide by putting the guide at the center of the coordinate system. After 
making the calculations, the follower mover manager orders the movement to 
that specified location at maximum speed for its mover (a screen ship). The 
mover takes its relative position at its best possible speed. Then, the follower 
mover manager makes its mover (a screen ship) adjust its speed according to 
the guide and protect its relative position. Thus, the follower mover manager also 
listens and checks for the guide ship’s movements to order its mover to a new 
destination. The follower mover manager UML diagram is shown in Figure 20, 
and the follower mover manager event graph is shown in Figure 21. 
  
Figure 20.  Follower Mover Manager UML Diagram. 
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Figure 21.  Follower Mover Manager Event Graph. 
F. HIGH VALUE UNIT MOVER MANAGER 
The HVU is the guide of the disposition movement according to the AAW 
Analysis Model. So, the screen ships adjust movements according to the HVU by 
listening to it. This is the real phenomenon, and is true for real operations. The 
HVU mover manager is a mover manager that makes the HVU move on the 
assigned path. It has an additional method to finish the simulation checking if the 
HVU reached its last stop location assigned at the beginning of simulation with a 
database file. If the HVU reaches that location, the simulation ends with success. 
G. GUN ROUND 
The gun round component for the ship is designed for the gun and CIWS 
engagement layer of the ship self-defense. Like SAM and ASM, it is an object 
and it is instantiated from the gun round pool list dynamically at the engagement 
step of gun and CIWS. The differences of gun and CIWS rounds are their speeds 
and probability of target kills. They are fired and reset with the same 
methodology that is used in ASM and SAM engagements. The gun round event 
graph and UML diagram are shown in Figures 22 and 23, respectively. 
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Figure 22.  Gun Round Event Graph. 
 
Figure 23.  Gun Round UML Diagram. 
H. ROUND MOVER MANAGER  
The round mover manager is the component used to move the gun and 
CIWS rounds. Unlike missile mover manager, it is not a mover manager that 
makes its mover adjust toward its target. The intercept of the target and the 
round is calculated at the beginning of the engagement process and makes its 
mover go toward the target. It has a parameter that defines the impact distance 
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like a missile mover manager. The round mover manager UML diagram is shown 
in Figure 24 and the round mover manager event graph is shown in Figure 25.  
 
Figure 24.  Round Mover Manager UML Diagram. 
 
Figure 25.  Round Mover Manager Event Graph. 
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I. SHIP SURVEILLANCE SENSOR 
The ship surveillance sensor is the primary sensor of the ship. It is a 
constant rate sensor. It has a rate of detection and a time delay to detect the 
target according to the rate of detection. The ship listens to its surveillance 
sensor for detection and classification events. It basically readies for engagement 
according to its target type after classification. For instance, if the target is 
classified as a ship, then the ship starts to engage with an ASM, or if it is defined 
as ASM, then the ship waits for the target to get inside its SAM engagement 
range and starts its layered defense. 
J. SHIP SENSOR FOR SAM ENGAGEMENT 
The ship sensor for SAM engagement is a cookie cutter sensor mounted 
on the ship to serve as a trigger for SAM engagement. After the target is 
detected by this sensor, the ship starts its engagement with a SAM. It is defined 
as a cookie cutter sensor because of its functionality.  
K. SHIP SENSOR FOR GUN ENGAGEMENT 
The ship sensor for gun engagement is a cookie cutter sensor mounted on 
the ship to serve as a trigger for gun engagement as part of a layered defense 
policy. After the target is detected by this sensor, the ship starts its engagement 
with its gun. It is defined as a cookie cutter sensor because of its functionality.  
L. SHIP SENSOR FOR CIWS ENGAGEMENT 
The ship sensor for CIWS engagement is a cookie cutter sensor mounted 
on the ship to serve a trigger for CIWS engagement as part of a layered defense 
policy. After the target is detected by this sensor, the ship starts its engagement 
with CIWS. It is defined as a cookie cutter sensor because of its functionality. 
M. CONTACT 
The contact component is a component that serves a mediator between 
the ship and the sensor after the enter range event of the sensor. In the enter 
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range event of the sensor, contact is instantiated with the sensor that detected 
the real object and the real object that is detected. The contact is passed as a 
parameter to the detection event instead of the real mover object. It has limited 
information about its real mover. It has a position distortion that is created 
according to a rotated bivariate normal distribution that has a standard deviation 
according to the detected real object’s relative position and its distance. This 
component is used to increase the realism and fidelity of the simulation, and it is 
essential for combat simulations, see Lucas (2000). For each of the sensors 
mentioned above, contact is provided with the sensors’ distortion factors and 
parameters. The contact component UML diagram and source code is shown in 
Figure 26 and an instance of distortion created by the contact component is 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
Inside the diagram we can see the source code that is used to generate random 
locations to simulate distortion of a sensor. 




This distortion is created by Contact Component for 10000 runs. 
Figure 27.  An Instance of Distortion.  
N. POLICY 
The policy is the component that controls ASM and SAM engagement 
processes for the ship. The ship may have two different policies for the 
engagement of SAM. One of them is Shoot-Shoot-Look and the other is Shoot-
Look-Shoot. These policies are implemented according to the policy component. 
If the Shoot-Shoot-Look policy is in force, the ship sends a certain number of 
missiles. The number of missiles sent is a parameter of the policy component. 
The ship checks whether the target has been destroyed and if it has not been 
destroyed then it sends another salvo. If the Shoot-Look-Shoot policy is in force, 
then the ship sends one missile before checking if the target has been destroyed, 
and if it has not been destroyed, sends another missile. These policies show the 
tradeoff between SAM inventory management and survivability. The policy 





In the event graph, the interaction of policy and the ship component is also shown. 
Figure 28.  Policy Component Event Graph.
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Figure 29.  Policy Component UML Diagram. 
O. ADJUDICATOR 
The adjudicator component serves as a decision module defined as part 
of each ship that is instantiated in the simulation. Each adjudicator for allied ships 
has the same parameters. The Red and Blue units may have different 
adjudicator parameters. It decides whether the target is destroyed or damaged 
after any particular impact event, according to a user-defined probability 
distribution. An impact event happens if a mover gets close enough to its target. 
For instance, these movers may be ASM, SAM, and gun. Each ship’s adjudicator 
makes judgments about its own ship and any interaction the ship or its weapons 
may have. It listens to mover managers of that ship’s weapons for impact events 
that are defined in mover managers of launched or fired weapons. It also listens 
to its own ship for any kill event. If a kill event happens for its own ship, it stops 
listening to the ship and removes the event listener pattern between the ship and 
that ship’s policy component. Each ship listens to its adjudicator for miss events 
to reengage targets. In accordance with its adjudicator, the ship engages its 
target, if its target is not destroyed. The adjudicator component event graph is 







Figure 30.  Adjudicator Component Event Graph.
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Figure 31.  Adjudicator Component UML Diagram. 
P. USAGE OF MICROSOFT ACCESS DATABASE, READING DATA 
FROM DATABASE  
Microsoft Access database software can be used to build simple personal 
database management systems. In this study, we need to make inquiries about 
various types of systems. For example, for ships, what guided missiles, guns, 
and radar components do they have? We also need lots of additional information 
about weapons or systems of ships, such as the ranges of guns, guided missiles, 
and sensors. That’s why it was an inevitable need to include data reading from a 
database query system. Nevertheless, because the tool that we built does not 
include very big and complex data queries and data inputs, a simple database 
management system like Microsoft Access database is sufficient. The application 
and study is open for necessary changes on database management as it grows.  
Since it is almost impossible to include all of the data needed in a single 
spreadsheet with the required level of complexity, spreadsheets were not used. 
In this situation, handling the data in multiple spreadsheets would decrease the 
power of the application. Additionally, the advantages that were gained from 
using a database are as follows:  
 The ability to link table elements. For instance, the weapon data 
table is linked to the main data table of ships (see Figure 32) and 
the weapon table’s elements can be displayed and selected from 
the associated column of main table.  
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Figure 32.  Ship Data Table in Microsoft Access Database. 
 The ability to read from a single file in a database. Manipulating the 
data is easier than using multiple spreadsheets.  
 Since all the tables are linked, any change in the data table exists 
in the main database.  
The question was how to read from a data table, which is possible in the 
Java programming language. An access database driver class created by 
Professor Arnold H. Buss has been used as a main tool. With that class, the 
ability to create a connection to an Access Database is gained.  
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 ANALYSIS OF THE AAW MODEL IV.
A. INTRODUCTION 
After building the simulation, the most important part of the study is using 
it to obtain insight into the factors affecting AAW. Outputs of the simulation, 
defined later as MOEs, and factors, such as input parameters, and appropriate 
design of experiments are crucial for the analysis.  
The AAW Analysis Model has a well-defined terminating state that is 
triggered either by the HVU reaching its goal or the HVU’s destruction by enemy 
ships. That’s why, before beginning any analysis, we have to state that it is a 
terminating simulation and conduct our analysis accordingly. For a terminating 
simulation with randomness, like the AAW Analysis Model, it is critical to have as 
many replications as we can, for different parameters, to capture the variability in 
the output and examine the dependencies between factors and output results. 
B. PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The first step in the analysis of the AAW Model is determining the 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to compute or to analyze. The MOEs are 
those that we can use to analyze the effectiveness of a system (Nakayama, 
2008). For the AAW Analysis Model, the HVU’s survival is our main interest. As 
stated previously, the AAW Analysis Model is a terminating simulation that stops 
for the following two reasons:  
 The HVU reaches the goal set at the beginning of the simulation, or  
 The HVU’s destruction by enemy units. 
Because it is a terminating simulation, it has transient MOEs (Nakayama, 
2008). The MOEs inside the AAW Analysis Model are as follows:  
 The HVU’s survival as a binary outcome; 
 The HVU’s efficiency level (remaining percentage of resilience 
againist enemy missiles and gun rounds) at the end of the 
simulation as a continuous output.  
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Measures of Performance (MOPs) are the factors or input combinations 
that affect a system’s performance. In the AAW Analysis Model, the outcomes 
are the efficiency of the HVU when the simulation is terminated and the binary 
outcome of the HVU’s survival. So, all the screen ship specifications that affect 
those outcomes, such as the number of ASMs that a screen ship has, the range 
of its sensors, and the range of its weapons, are the MOPs in the AAW Analysis 
Model. 
Each iteration for each combination of factors is going to be independent, 
so that the data collected from that simulation can be analyzed using classical 
statistics (Sanchez, 2007). Since the outputs are going to be analyzed on a  
finite time horizon, the initial conditions at the beginning of the simulation may 
significantly affect the result of the AAW Analysis Model. That’s why, 
assumptions and—for different scenarios—initial conditions are defined 
separately. Because of time constraints, a limited number of scenarios have 
been analyzed.  
C. SCENARIOS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Assumptions 
Key AAW Analysis Model assumptions are listed below: 
1. Initial conditions may impact the simulation outputs of the AAW 
Analysis Model. The initial conditions are the main assumptions, 
and they are stated in scenarios.  
2. Probabilities of kill and probabilities of hits for particular types of 
engagements stated above are assumed to come from a uniform 
distribution and impact calculations assume they are greater than 
particular thresholds that are listed for each adjudicator.  
 The ASM-ship engagement probability of hit 
 The SAM-ASM engagement probability of kill 
 The gun-ASM engagement probability of kill 
 The gun-ship engagement probability of hit 
 The CIWS-ASM engagement probability of kill 
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3. Armstrong (Armstrong, 2005), in his study about stochastic salvo 
model naval surface combats, proposed a stochastic damage 
function that is normally distributed with the mean (1/Number of 
Combat Ships) on the side that is taking an ASM hit, and a 
standard deviation (1/2.5*Number of Combat Ships). In the AAW 
Analysis Model, using this approach, a truncated normal distribution 
for the ASM and the gun damage functions between minimum and 
maximum damage parameters is assumed. However, parameters 
of that normal distribution, the minimum and maximum damage 
parameters vary by the design points. Thus, the parameters of 
these normal equations are among the input factors of the AAW 
Analysis Model. 
4. Ships are assumed to have 100 efficiency level (remaining 
percentage of resilience againist enemy ASMs and gun rounds) at 
the beginning of the scenario for both Blue and Red ships. The 
efficiency levels of ships decrease with the successful ASM and 
gun round hits they take. For instance, HVU’s efficiency level is a 
measure of the ship’s resilience to hits from ASMs and gun rounds. 
At time 0, it is 100 and is decreased by a random amount each time 
the ship is hit.  
5. Frigates for both sides are assumed to have surveillance radars for 
detection; ASMs, Guns, and CIWs as weapons—and specific kinds 
of engagement radars for ASM, SAM and CIWS engagements. 
6. The HVU on the Blue side is assumed to have only CIWS and a 
surveillance radar.  
7. Blue ships and Red ships are not expected to make avoidance 
maneuvers against each other at the time of detection and they 
continue on their planned routes.  
8. Blue screen ships are assumed to keep the relative positions and 
distances specified at the beginning of the scenario.  
9. Red ships are assumed to keep their speeds and routes according 
to the patrol paths specified at the beginning of the scenario. 
10. Detection rates of surveillance radars for both Blue and Red ships 
are constant during the scenario and time until detection come from 
an exponential distribution. Blue and Red ships may have different 
parameters for detection rates of radars for each design point.  
11. Ships that are on the same side do not coordinate their attacks. 
They attack every live target classified as an enemy contact. 
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12. Engagements of SAM, gun and CIWS weapons against ASMs are 
made primarily according to the state and distance of targets on the 
given order below as part of a layered defense: 
 SAMs 
 Guns  
 CIWS 
13. Engagements against ships are made according to distances and 
states of the enemy ships with the given order below: 
 ASMs 
 Guns 
14. Targets are not prioritized. Targets are engaged by the detection 
order of the ships.  
15. The ASM, the SAM launch, and the gun/CIWS engagement policy 
by the ships are as follows:  
 ASM launch authorization is given if the conditions below 
occur: 
 Any impact of the previously launched ASM if there 
is one. (These impacts may occur between the ASM 
and enemy ships, the ASM-enemy defensive gun 
and the ASM-enemy defensive SAM.)  
 Any detection of an enemy ship if the enemy ship is 
classified alive and the enemy ship is not inside the 
gun range. (An alive classification is primarily made 
by checking the movement of the enemy ship.) 
 A sufficient number of ASMs are on the ship. 
 The ship’s efficiency level is sufficient.  
 The SAM launch may happen any number of times 
according to the Shoot-Look-Shoot policy or Shoot-Shoot-
Look policy. Looking represents checking whether the target 
is still alive after an intercept should have occurred. The 
SAM engagement can happen if:  
 The target is detected, classified as an ASM and 
moving.  
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 The target is not inside the CIWs or the gun range.  
 Gun engagement to ASMs may occur if: 
 The target is detected and classified as an ASM and 
moving. 
 The target could not be destroyed by a SAM and is 
inside the gun’s range.  
 A gun engagement to ships may occur if: 
 A target is detected, classified as enemy ship and 
moving. 
 The target is inside the gun range. 
 The CIWS engagement to ASMs may occur if: 
 The target is detected, classified as ASM and moving. 
 The target is inside the CIWS range.  
16. The probability of hit for each engagement type is constant during 
each run for each design point.  
17. Engagement sensors are cookie-cutter sensors for only engaging 
detected targets. 
18. Enemy targets detected by sensors are not directly passed to the 
ship for engagement. Each sensor is assumed to have a distortion 
with a rotated bivariate normal distribution scaled by the target’s 
relative distance and relative angle according to the ship’s position. 
These distortion parameters for sensors may also change in each 
design point. After the target is detected, the distortion does not 
change over time. 
19. Sensor and weapon positions on the ships and their effects are 
ignored. 
20. Screen ships take their positions at maximum speeds at the 
beginning of the scenario and maintain them with the HVU, taking 
its speed and route into consideration, and using the follower mover 
manager. 
21. Real data is not used for modeling weapons and sensors. Instead, 
by varying parameters, effects on output are examined.  
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22. Ships are assumed to have a check interval for target positions, 
states, and velocity updates. This check interval is also introduced 
as a factor inside the AAW Analysis Model. 
23. Any air threat other than ASMs and gun rounds by enemy ships are 
assumed not to exist inside the scenarios. 
24. The only surface threats are frigates of particular types.  
25. Any soft kill methods for AAW threats are ignored.  
26. Ships do not make any evasive maneuvers for incoming air threats.  
27. The minimum distance of impacts for each ship’s weapon is also 
introduced as a factor to analyze. 
28. Missiles for both sides are assumed to have the same quality of 
guidance in the simulation, and they use the same missile mover 
manager. 
29. A ship surveillance sensor range is the same as its ASM range. In 
other words, a ship can engage any target which it detects with its 
surveillance sensor.  
30. Gun rounds and CIWS rounds do not have guidance.  
31. All the moving entities inside the simulation use Basic Linear 
Movement. Basic Linear Movement is assumed to capture all the 
effects of movements in those particular types of missions and 
operational areas.  
32. The simulation is conducted in a 2D environment. 3D effects, like 
the height of radars, ships, and missile engagements, and their 
effects are ignored.  
33. Air propagation conditions and the uncertainty they introduce are 
assumed to be captured by radar detection rates, distortion factors 
and mean detection times.  
34. Red forces are assumed to have identical frigates for each 
scenario. That is, for instance, in any scenario all the Red frigates 
have the same ASM launch delay after classification of a target as 
an enemy.  
35. Blue forces are assumed to have identical frigates. That is, for 
instance, in any scenario, all the Blue frigates will have the same 
ASM launch delay after classification of a target as an enemy. Blue 
ships properties may be different from Red ship properties to 
capture the effects of the factors for both enemy and friendly units.  
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36. The classification of enemy units is assumed to be always correct. 
That is, no misclassifications of targets are introduced in the 
simulation. In other words, an enemy unit cannot be classified 
friendly or vice versa. This effect is assumed to be captured by 
classification times.  
2. Scenarios 
In each scenario, Red forces are making patrols in their predefined areas 
of operation and paths. Red’s mission is engaging the blue ships detected in their 
patrol area and destroying them. The policy about engagement priority is not 
defined. They engage according to the classification of an enemy unit and their 
primary criterion is detection order.  
The threat axis at the initial scenario condition is south and north. As the 
Blue convoy moves on its path and Red ships make their patrols on their paths, 
the threat axis is subject to change and may be 360 degrees according to route 
changes.  
a. Scenario 1  
In scenario 1, the blue convoy consists of three frigates and the HVU and 
the Red force consists of two frigates. The Blue screen ships protect the HVU. 
The mission of the Blue convoy is to reach the predefined convoy goal position 
by protecting the HVU. The HVU’s survival is the crucial objective of the mission. 
If the HVU is destroyed by the Red ships, the mission fails.  
b. Scenario 2 
In scenario 2, the Blue convoy consists of four frigates and the HVU and 
the Red force consists of four frigates. Blue screen ships protect the HVU. The 
mission of the Blue convoy is to reach the predefined convoy goal position by 
protecting the HVU. The HVU’s survival is the crucial goal of the mission. If the 
HVU is destroyed by the Red ships, the mission fails.  
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Figure 34.  Scenario 2 Initial Conditions. 
c. Scenario 3  
In scenario 3, the Blue convoy consists of three frigates and the HVU and 
the Red force consists of four frigates. Blue screen ships protect the HVU. The 
mission of the Blue convoy is to reach the predefined convoy goal position by 
protecting the HVU. The HVU’s survival is the crucial goal of the mission. If the 
HVU is destroyed by the Red ships, the mission fails. 
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Figure 35.  Scenario 3 Initial Conditions. 
D. AAW ANALYSIS MODEL FACTORS 
Sanchez and Wan (2012) explains potential factors in simulations as 
follows: “Potential factors in a simulation are the input parameters or the 
distributional parameters of a simulation model” (p.4). The factors for Blue units 
inside the AAW Analysis Model correspond to MOPs. However, factors do not 
necessarily correspond to the input parameters of the simulation. For instance, in 
the AAW Analysis Model, keeping some attributes of Red ships and changing the 
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attributes of Blue ships over a range may be a more appropriate way to conduct 
analysis (Sanchez & Wan, 2012).  
E. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The first thing that we have determined for the analysis of the AAW Model 
is the factors that affected the simulation output, which is the binary outcome of 
HVU survival when the simulation is terminated. In the DOE, factors are 
independent input variables that potentially impact on the output. In a simulation 
experiment, the number of factors we have depends on the model and what we 
want to analyze. Each of the factors may take a variety of values. Each of the 
possible values a factor can take is called a level in the DOE. The first goal of the 
DOE is identifying the factors that are the most impactful on the output or 
response variable. A second goal is identifying the form of the impact of each 
factor on the response variable as a function. These can include, but are not 
limited to, linear or quadratic relationships or even the interactions between 
factors (Sanchez & Wan, 2012). For instance we want to quantify how the 
detection rate of the Blue ships affects the efficiency or the survival of the HVU. 
The AAW Analysis Model consists of many factors and parameters that 
may affect the simulation outputs. The HVU’s efficiency is our primary MOE, and 
we are going to investigate effects of the factors previously stated under the 
assumptions. The AAW Analysis Model is moderately complex and has a 
moderate level of resolution. To understand the effects of all the factors, an 
efficient design of experiments is crucial.  
An efficient DOE can efficiently explore this dimensionality at a tiny 
fraction of computational cost relative to a full factorial exploration. If we suppose 
a simulation with 100 factors and decide to explore all the combinations of those 
100 factors using a full factorial design with only two levels, we would require 1002
design points. In that case, even with a super computer that has 16 petaflop 
capacity—assuming each run takes one second—total simulation run time would 
take millions of years. A couple of design alternatives illustrate the efficient 
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design of experiments. For example, one of them is Resolution V fractional 
factorial design; in the case of 100 factors with two levels we require 32,768 
design points (Sanchez & Wan, 2012). In that case, with an 8-core desktop 
(costing roughly $1000), we would have finished a set of experiments “takes a 
more reasonable one minute to run” in 2.85 days (Sanchez & Wan, 2012). Some 
other design alternatives we can have almost the same efficiency and even 
achieve better insights for the model.  
It is very useful to classify the factors on several types: 
 Quantitative or qualitative: Quantitative factors take numerical 
values; on the other hand, qualitative factors do not. However, they 
may be assigned codes. In the AAW Analysis Model, for instance, 
the detection rate, the ASM range, or SAM ranges are quantitative 
factors, whereas, ship policy types are qualitative.  
 Discrete or Continuous (for quantitative factors only): Discrete 
factors are the ones that have levels only at certain levels. 
However, continuous factors may have any real value in a specified 
interval. The total numbers of SAMs or ASMs in the AAW Analysis 
Model are examples of discrete factors. 
 Binary or Not: Binary factors are naturally bounded to two levels, 
like classification. In the AAW Analysis Model, the HVU’s survival is 
binary. However, it is a response variable. Inside the AAW Analysis 
Model, we do not have any binary factors. 
 Controllable or uncontrollable: Even though in a simulation 
experiment all factors can be manipulated, in real life some factors 
cannot be controlled by operators. For instance, in the AAW 
Analysis Model, enemy ship attributes are uncontrollable factors in 
real life. Nevertheless, we will leverage the advantage of the 
simulation to make a robust analysis. We will assume we can also 
change enemy ship’s attributes. Thus, they will also be treated as 
simulation factors (Sanchez & Wan, 2012).  
The factors to be analyzed inside the AAW Analysis Model are listed as 
follows: 
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1. Discrete Factors 
a. Controllable 
 Blue ship SAM launch policy (Shoot-Look-Shoot/Shoot-
Shoot-Look) 
 Blue ship number of SAMs to launch between each look 
 Blue ship total number of ASMs in each ship 
 Blue ship total number of SAMs in each ship 
b. Uncontrollable 
 Red ship SAM launch policy (Shoot-Look-Shoot/Shoot-
Shoot-Look) 
 Red ship number of SAMs to launch between each look 
 Red ship total number of ASMs in each ship 
 Red ship total number of SAMs in each ship 
2. Continuous Factors 
a. Controllable 
 Blue Ship inter-shot delays between gun fires  
 Blue Ship inter-shot delays between CIWS fires 
 Blue ship classification time 
 Blue ship detection rate for surveillance sensor 
 Blue ship ASM launch delay 
 Blue ship SAM launch delay 
 Blue ship ASM range 
 Blue ship SAM range 
 Blue ship gun range 
 Blue ship CIWS range 
 Blue ship ASM red ship damage probability 
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 Blue ship gun red ship damage probability 
 Blue ship gun round red ASM kill probability 
 Blue ship SAM Red ASM kill probability 
 Blue ship CIWS rounds red ASM kill probability 
 Close enough distance (CED) for impact of blue ASM 
 CED for impact of blue SAM 
 CED for impact of blue gun round 
 CED for impact of blue CIWS round 
 Blue ship surveillance sensor distortion factors 
 Blue ship engagement sensor distortion factors 
 Blue ship ASM and gun minimum and maximum damages 
 Blue ship maximum speed  
 Blue ship weapon speeds 
 Blue ship target check interval 
 Blue ship surveillance sensors time to detection 
 Blue ship efficiency threshold 
 HVU maximum speed 
 HVU CIWS range 
 HVU CIWS CED for red ASM impact 
 HVU CIWS inter shoot delay time 
 HVU efficiency threshold 
 Blue ship ASM damage function parameters 
 Blue ship gun damage function parameters 
b. Uncontrollable 
 Red Ship inter-shot delays between gun fires  
 Red Ship inter-shot delays between CIWS fires 
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 Red ship classification time 
 Red ship detection rate for surveillance sensor 
 Red ship ASM launch delay 
 Red ship SAM launch delay 
 Red ship ASM range 
 Red ship SAM range 
 Red ship gun range 
 Red ship CIWS range 
 Red ship ASM red ship damage probability 
 Red ship gun red ship damage probability 
 Red ship gun round red ASM kill probability 
 Red ship SAM Red ASM kill probability 
 Red ship CIWS rounds red ASM kill probability 
 CED for impact of blue ASM 
 CED for impact of blue SAM 
 CED for impact of blue gun round 
 CED for impact of blue CIWS round 
 Red ship surveillance sensor distortion factors 
 Red ship engagement sensor distortion factors 
 Red ship ASM and gun minimum and maximum damages 
 Red ship maximum speed  
 Red ship weapon speeds 
 Red ship target check interval 
 Red ship surveillance sensors time to detection 
 Red ship efficiency threshold 
 Red ship ASM damage function parameters 
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 Red ship gun damage function parameters 
Mathematically, if we denote 1 2 3, , ,... nX X X X  as n factors in our simulation 
experiment and let Y  be the response variable, which is the HVU’s survival or 
efficiency in our model. What we are interested in is building a response 
metamodel that approximates and represents relationships between factors and 
response variables in our simulation. To reach that goal, we can use statistical 
methods such as regression models (Sanchez & Wan, 2012). If we can create a 
good metamodel of AAW analysis simulation and have reasonable insights that 
we can prove some concepts in AAW, this model can also be expanded and 
used for further purposes. It can also help us explore some concepts in AAW that 
are not explored and gain better understanding of how AAW ship design should 
be, and what kind of ships should be sent to naval convoy operations and what 
tactics they should use. 
F. EXPLORATION OF POTENTIAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
Many design alternatives are available in the literature, and it is almost 
impossible to analyze all of the possible alternatives in experimental designs. 
The most useful and suitable ones for the AAW Analysis Model are a small 
subset of them. The first and most straightforward approach for experimental 
designs are gridded or factorial designs (Sanchez & Wan, 2012). According to 
Sanchez and Wan, among gridded or factorial designs, if we are looking for 
inspection of only linear effects and interactions, coarse grids ( 2k factorials) are 
the best and the most efficient design. On the other hand, fine grids (more than 
two levels for factors) may provide more detailed information about the 
response—such as a nonlinear relationship. That method provides efficiency for 
building metamodels of response variables. Resolution five fractional factorial 
designs (RVFF) allow linear main effects and interactions to be explored. They 
look like the best choice if we have few levels of quantitative factors or qualitative 
factors with two levels. By expanding RVFFs to central composite designs, we 
may gain more information about non-linear effects.  
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If the number of factors is large, as it is in the AAW Analysis Model, more 
efficient design alternatives are required. Latin hypercube (LH) designs have 
been proved to be good for exploring complex simulations when we have little 
information about response surfaces (Sanchez & Wan, 2012).  
We can flexibly construct efficient designs by using LH designs. 
Additionally, we can have more efficient space-filling than we have in factorial 
designs with orders of magnitude less sampling and enough information about 
the center of experimental design.  
The most useful and straightforward design possibilities for the AAW 
Analysis Model can be listed as follows (Sanchez & Wan, 2012):  
 2k  Factorial Designs (Coarse Grids) 
 km  Factorial Designs (Finer Grids) 
 2k p  Resolution 5 Fractional Factorial and Central Composite 
Designs 
 Space Filling Designs, such as Latin hypercubes (LHs) 
As previously stated, factorial (or gridded) designs may look like the most 
straightforward way to design the experiments. Nevertheless, they increase the 
design points required by many orders of magnitude over other approaches. For 
the AAW Analysis Model, in the simplest case, we would have 99 factors, most of 
which are continuous. Even if we were able to consider them with only two levels, 
we would have 992  factors, which would require trillions of years of running to 
obtain all these design point runs, even with supercomputers like roadrunner.  
Cioppa and Lucas (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007) came up with nearly 
orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) designs that provides the excellent space-
filling for a small or moderate number of factors up to 29. Hernandez, Lucas, and 
Carlyle, 2012, expanded on the number of factors that can be investigated with 
NOLHs. This provides an ability to examine much denser designs with much less 
effort compared to full factorial and fractional factorial designs. For instance, with 
257 design points we can efficiently construct a designed set of experiments with 
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29 factors, whereas, we would need 292  design points with a full factorial design 
even if we only consider each factor with 2 levels. Coming up with only two levels 
for the continuous factors of the AAW Analysis Model is almost impossible. And 
doing so would make it impossible to identify response thresholds or non-linear 
effects. Additionally, we would obtain less space-filling. Assuming each design 
point takes one second to run, with the NOLH, it would take under five minutes to 
run a single replication of each design point on one processor. However, for a 29 
factorial design, this would take 17 years to run under the same conditions 
(Sanchez & Wan, 2012).  
The AAW Analysis Model includes 99 factors with 8 discrete and 91 
continuous ones that we wish to explore. Thus, a denser DOE experiment is 
required. Vieira in 2012 (Vieira, Sanchez , Kienitz, & Belldarrain, 2012) came up 
with a Nearly Orthogonal Nearly Balanced (NOB) design which allows analyzing 
10 blocks of 20 k-level factors (k=2,3,…11) and 100 continuous factors with 512 
design points (Vieira et al., 2012). This design has a maximum absolute pairwise 
correlation of 3.56%, which is an acceptable level for regression analysis. In 
statistics, having all the factors orthogonal—in other words, having a correlation 
of zero among the factors—is the most favorable situation to come up with the 
best metamodel. However, for this many factors, where orthogonality is 
impossible, the NOB is a good solution. So, the AAW Analysis Model DOE is 
determined to be built using the NOB design. 
More replications for each design point are highly favorable to capture 
variability inside the model. So, the AAW Analysis Model is run 1000 times for 
each design point with different scenarios. This ensures that a standard error on 
the probability of HVU survival is no greater than .016. The ranges that are 
defined for each factor to create a NOB design using NOB_Mixed_512DP_v1 
(Vieira et al., 2012) are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.   Controllable Factor Ranges and Explanations (for Each Blue Ship). 
# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 





2 Blue ship number of times to shoot before look 1–3 - 
The number of 
times that SAM is 
launched before 
each look if the 
“ShootShootLook” 
policy is on force  
3 Blue ship total number of ASMs 8–18 - 
Total number of 
ASMs 
4 Blue ship total number SAMs 16–26 - 
Total Number of 
SAMs  
5 Blue ship inter-shot delays between gun fires 5–25 seconds 




Blue ship inter-shot 
delays between CIWS 
fires 
1–5 seconds 
The time delay 
between CIWS 
fires 
7 Blue ship classification times 0–5 minutes 
The deterministic 
time that is 
needed to classify 
an enemy unit  






time comes from 
exponential 
distribution with 
the parameter of 
the detection rate. 
9 Blue ship ASM launch delay 5–45  seconds 
The time delay 
that ASM is 
launched after 
classification of a 
target as an 
enemy 
10 Blue ship SAM launch delay 5–25 seconds 
The time delay to 
launch a SAM 
after classification 
of a target as an 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
ASM 
11 Blue ship ASM range 100–250 NM 
The range of 
ASMs (Same with 
the range of 
surveillance 
sensor)  
12 Blue ship SAM range 75–150 NM 
The range of 
SAMs (Same with 
the range of SAM 
engagement 
sensor) 
13 Blue ship gun range 50–100 NM 
Range of gun 
(Same with the 
range of gun 
engagement 
sensor) 
14 Blue ship CIWS range 25–75 NM 
Range of CIWS 
(Same with the 
range of CIWS 
engagement 
sensor) 
15 Blue ship ASM Red ship damage probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue ASM can 
damage Red ship 
provided that it 
has impacted 
16 Blue ship gun Red ship damage probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue gun 
round can 
damage Red ship 
provided that it 
has impacted 
17 Blue ship gun round Red ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue gun 
round can 
eliminate one Red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
18 Blue ship SAMs Red ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue SAM can 
eliminate one Red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
19 Blue ship CIWS round Red ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue CIWS 
round can 
eliminate one red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
20 CED for impact of Blue ASMs 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for an 
ASM to impact 
21 CED for impact of Blue SAM 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a 
SAM to impact 
22 CED for impact of Blue gun round 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a gun 
round to impact 
23 CED for impact of Blue CIWS rounds 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a 
CIWS round to 
impact 
24 
Blue ship surveillance 
sensor distortion mean on 
x axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Blue ship surveillance 
sensor distortion mean on 
y axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Blue ship surveillance 
sensor distortion standard 










Blue ship surveillance 
sensor distortion standard 






on y axis for 
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Blue ship engagement 
sensor distortion mean x 
axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Blue ship engagement 
sensor distortion mean y 
axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Blue ship engagement 
sensor distortion standard 










Blue ships engagement 
sensors distortion 







on y axis for 
engagement 
sensors 
32 Blue ship ASM minimum damage 10–25 %Efficiency
Minimum damage 
that ASM can give 
33 Blue ship ASM maximum damage 40–100 %Efficiency
Maximum damage 
that ASM can give 
34 Blue ship gun minimum damage 5–10 %Efficiency
Minimum damage 
that gun round 
can give 
35 Blue ships gun maximum damage 20–40 %Efficiency
Maximum damage 
that gun round 
can give 











# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 




of gun round 




of CIWS round 
40 
Blue ship surveillance 
sensor time delay until 
detection  
1–10 seconds 
Required time to 
detect a contact 
for surveillance 
sensor  
41 Blue ship efficiency threshold 10–50 Out of 100 
Threshold that is 
required to 
destroy a blue 
screen ship.  
42 HVU maximum speed 2–10 Knots Maximum speed of HVU 
43 HVU CIWS Range 25–75 NM HVU CIWS range 
44 
HVU CIWS close enough 




required for an 
HVU CIWS round 
to impact  
45 HVU CIWS inter-shot delay times 1–5 seconds 
The delay time 
between CIWS 
fires 
46 HVU efficiency threshold 10–50 Out of 100 
Threshold that is 
required to 
destroy an HVU. 
47 Blue ship ASM damage mean 25–50 %Efficiency
The mean 
parameter of ASM 
damage function, 
which comes from 
a normal 
distribution 
48 Blue ship ASM damage standard deviation 10–20 %Efficiency
The standard 
deviation 
parameter of ASM 
Damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution
49 Blue ship gun damage mean 10–20 %Efficiency
The mean 
parameter of gun 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
50 Blue ship gun damage standard deviation 4–8 %Efficiency
The standard 
deviation 
parameter of gun 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution
51 Blue ship maximum speed 11–20 Knots 
Maximum Speed 
of Blue Ships 
52 Blue ship target check interval 5–20 Seconds 
How frequent the 
enemy target is 
checked after 
detection (No new 
detection is made. 
The target has the 
same distortion) 
The uncontrollable factors, their ranges, and explanations are shown in 
Table 2.  
Table 2.   Uncontrollable Factor Ranges and Explanations (for Each Red Ship). 
# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 





2 Red ship number of times to shoot before look 1–3 - 
The number of 
times that SAM is 
launched before 
each look if 
“ShootShootLook” 
policy is on force  
3 Red ship total number of ASMs 8–18 - 
Total number of 
ASMs 
4 Red ship total number SAMs 16–26 - 
Total Number of 
SAMs  
5 Red ship inter-shot delays between gun Fires 5–25 seconds 
The time delay 
between gun 
shots 
6 Red ship inter-shot delays between CIWS fires 1–5 seconds 
The time delay 
between CIWS 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
fires 
7 Red ship classification times 0–5 minutes 
The deterministic 
time that is 
needed to classify 
an enemy unit  







time comes from 
exponential 
distribution with 
the parameter of 
detection rate.  
9 Red ship ASM launch delay 5–45  seconds 
The time delay 
that ASM is 
launched after 
classification of a 
target as an 
enemy 
10 Red ship SAM launch delay 5–25 seconds 
The time delay to 
launch a SAM 
after classification 
of a target as an 
ASM 
11 Red ship ASM range 100–250 NM 
The range of 
ASMs (Same with 
the range of 
surveillance 
sensor)  
12 Red ship SAM range 75–150 NM 
The range of 
SAMs (Same with 
the range of SAM 
engagement 
sensor) 
13 Red ship gun range 50–100 NM 
Range of gun 
(Same with the 
range of gun 
engagement 
Sensor) 
14 Red ship CIWS range 25–75 NM 
Range of CIWS 
(Same with the 




# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
15 Red ship ASM Blue ship damage probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue ASM can 
damage Red ship 
provided that it 
has impacted 
16 Red ship gun Blue ship damage probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue gun 
round can damage 
Red ship provided 
that it has 
impacted 
17 Red ship gun round Blue ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue gun 
round can 
eliminate one Red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
18 Red ship SAMs Blue ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue SAM can 
eliminate one red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
19 Red ship CIWS round Blue ASM kill probability 0–1 - 
Probability that 
one Blue CIWS 
round can 
eliminate one Red 
ASM provided that 
it has impacted 
20 CED for impact of Red ASMs 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for an 
ASM to impact 
21 CED for impact of Red SAM 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a 
SAM to impact 
22 CED for impact of Red gun round 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a gun 
round to impact 
23 CED for impact of Red CIWS rounds 1–10 meters 
The distance 
required for a 
CIWS round to 
impact 
24 Red ship surveillance sensor distortion mean on 1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 





Red ship surveillance 
sensor distortion mean on 
y axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Red ship surveillance 
sensor distortion standard 
deviation on x axis 
1–10 centimeters
Standard deviation 
of rotated bivariate 
normal distribution 




Red ship surveillance 
sensor distortion standard 
deviation on y axis 
1–10 centimeters
Standard deviation 
of rotated bivariate 
normal distribution 




Red ship engagement 
sensor distortion mean x 
axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Red ship engagement 
sensor distortion mean y 
axis 
1–10 meters 
Mean of rotated 
bivariate normal 





Red ship engagement 
sensor distortion standard 
deviation on x axis 
1–10 centimeters
Standard deviation 
of rotated bivariate 
normal distribution 




Red ships engagement 
sensors distortion 
standard deviation on y 
1–10 centimeters
Standard deviation 
of rotated bivariate 
normal distribution 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
axis on y axis for 
engagement 
sensors 
32 Red ship ASM minimum damage 10–25 %Efficiency
Minimum damage 
that ASM can give 
33 Red ship ASM maximum damage 40–100 %Efficiency
Maximum damage 
that ASM can give 
34 Red ship gun minimum damage 5–10 %Efficiency
Minimum damage 
that gun round can 
give 
35 Red ships gun maximum damage 20–40 %Efficiency
Maximum damage 
that gun round can 
give 














of gun round 




of CIWS round 
40 
Red ship surveillance 
sensor time delay until 
detection  
1–10 seconds 
Required time to 
detect a contact 
for surveillance 
sensor  
41 Red ship efficiency threshold 10–50 Out of 100 
Threshold that is 
required to destroy 
a Blue screen 
ship.  
42 Red ship ASM damage mean 25–50 %Efficiency
The mean 
parameter of ASM 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution 
43 Red ship ASM Damage standard deviation 10–20 %Efficiency
The standard 
deviation 
parameter of ASM 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution 
44 Red ship gun damage mean 10–20 %Efficiency
The mean 
parameter of gun 
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# Factor  Range Unit Explanation 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution 
45 Red ship gun damage standard deviation 4–8 %Efficiency
The standard 
deviation 
parameter of gun 
damage function 
that comes from a 
normal distribution 
46 Red ship maximum speed 11–20 Knots Maximum speed of blue ships 
47 Red ship target check interval 5–20 Seconds 
How frequent the 
enemy target is 
checked after 
detection (No new 
detection is made. 
The target has the 
same distortion) 
G. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
1. Overview  
JMP Pro 12.0 (SAS Institute Inc., 1989) software is used as a statistical 
analysis tool. Three scenarios were analyzed. These three scenarios were each 
run 1000 times at each of 512 design points that were created systematically 
using a NOB Design (Vieira et al., 2012). This resulted in 512,000 simulated 
AAW battles in each of the three scenarios. Each run took an average of three 
milliseconds on a personal computer with an Intel (R) Core (TM) i7–4810MQ 2.8 
Ghz CPU and 8 GB RAM. Run times varied depending on the number of ships 
instantiated. This was an expected result, because the number of calculations 
and objects instantiated increased as the number of ships in the scenario 
increased. The first MOE was the efficiency level of the HVU and the second 
MOE was the binary value showing whether the HVU survived or not, which 
meant the HVU’s efficiency level was greater than its efficiency threshold, as 
previously mentioned. For each scenario, averages of these two MOEs are 
shown in Table 3. 
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1 3 2 88.99 94.7 
2 4 4 79.97 86 
3 3 4 69.66 77.1 
 
In this section a very coarse analysis is made, since it aggregates across 
the factor settings. The results clearly show that as the number of Blue ships 
increases relative to Red, the rate of HVU’s survival (binary outcome of HVU 
survival) and the mean efficiency level increases. This result can be seen if 
scenario 2 and scenario 3 are compared. Boxplots for mean HVU efficiencies 
and survivals are displayed in Figures 36 and 37. 
 
Figure 36.  Comparative Boxplots of Mean HVU Efficiency by Scenario.  
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Figure 37.  Comparative Boxplots of Mean HVU Survival by Scenario.  
Additionally, as the number of Red ships increases, the mean of the 
HVU’s survival and the mean efficiency level of HVU decreases. This can be 
realized, if we check scenarios 1 and 3. Figures 38, 39 and 40 show the 
distribution of mean HVU efficiencies and survivals for each scenario depending 
on each design point.  
 




Figure 39.  Distribution of Mean Efficiencies and Survivals of HVU in 
Scenario 2. 
 
Figure 40.  Distribution of Mean Efficiencies and Survivals of HVU in 
Scenario 3. 
The distribution of mean HVU efficiencies and survivals show that they are 
not normally distributed. Normal Quantile plots for mean HVU efficiencies and 
survivals also support the skewed distribution.  
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Figure 41.  Normal Quantile Plot for Mean HVU Efficiencies.  
 
Figure 42.  Normal Quantile Plot for Mean HVU Survivals. 
Because they are not normally distributed, we used non-parametric 
comparisons for each pair using the Wilcoxon method (Wackerly, Mendenhall, & 
Scheaffer, 2002) to compare the means of HVU efficiencies and survivals for 
each scenario.  
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Figure 43.  Non-parametric Comparisons for Mean Efficiencies of HVU at 
Each Scenario. 
 
Figure 44.  Non-Parametric Comparisons for Mean Survivals of HVU at 
Each Scenario. 
The results show a significant difference among all pairs of means for 
efficiencies. Also, we see in the non-parametric comparisons for each pair that 
scenario 2 mean efficiencies, where we have four Blue and four Red ships, is 
greater than scenario 3 mean HVU efficiencies, with three Blue and four Red 
ships at an α = 0.05 significance level. Additionally, the difference in mean HVU 
efficiencies between scenario 1 and scenario 3 shows the effect of increasing the 
number of Red ships. Thus, having more blue ships increases the mean 
efficiency level of the HVU; whereas, if there are more enemy ships, it decreases 
the likelihood of survival. Also, the non-parametric comparison tests on mean 
survival of HVU complement the results, as expected.  
2. Analysis of Scenarios 
In this section, the data from all three scenarios have been aggregated. 
Then, partition tree analysis has been made on the aggregate data where we 
had 1,536,000 simulated AAW battles on the Blue ship properties for a robust 
analysis. Afterwards, a nominal logistic regression analysis was fit on the binary 
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outcome of the HVU’s survival depending on the parameters of Blue ships. Two 
different analysis methods were adopted to check whether they complement 
each other. 
After analyzing the Blue ship properties, both partition tree and logistic 
regression methodologies are leveraged to analyze the effects of all the factors, 
including the Red ship parameters. This analysis led us to understand which 
properties were the most effective on the survival of the HVU, including the Red 
ship properties.  
There was another option of fitting a least squares regression on the 
response of mean efficiency levels/survivals on Blue ship parameters up to two-
way interactions. This was going to be done by collapsing the efficiency levels/ 
survivals on each design point by taking an average of 1000 runs. However, that 
violated normality assumption residuals and the constant variance assumption of 
residual by predicted plots. Also, as aforementioned, response variables were 
not normally distributed. That’s why fitting a multiple linear regression was not a 
good option for analysis of individual scenarios. The assumption violations for the 
aggregate data from all three scenarios are seen in Figure 45. In this analysis, 
mean efficiency of HVU is the response variable and Blue ship parameters are 
explanatory variables.  
Figure 45 demonstrates that it is impossible to get a good fit by fitting a 
least squares regression for that data. As seen in the figure, the residuals do not 
come from a normal distribution and show a clear constant variance violation. We 
can transform the response variable. However, instead of that option, using more 
appropriate analysis methods for that analysis would be better. So a nominal 
logistic fit, which assumes the predictors come from a binomial distribution, and a 
partition tree, which does not require any assumptions about the data, have been 
adopted. These two methodologies do not particularly make any assumptions 




Figure 45.  Assumption Violations of Least Squares Regression of Mean 
Efficiency of HVU. 
3. Analysis of All Factors Including Enemy Ship Factors 
For some operations, factors of enemy units may have substantial effect 
on success. If we have that information before starting the operations, we can try 
to eliminate or decrease the efficiency of the most important factors that enemy 
units have.  
For that purpose, we analyzed all aggregate data from the three scenarios 
including both Blue ship and Red ship properties, even if they are uncontrollable 
factors. The same analysis methodology is used to have the most effective 
factors on the HVU’s survival as a binary outcome. First, we analyzed data with a 
partition tree to classify the binary outcome of the HVU’s survival. Afterwards, we 
fit a nominal logistic regression on all factors.  
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a. Partition Tree 
In this section, we partitioned the aggregate data from all three scenarios 
using all the factors for Blue ships and Red ships. The simulation had 99 factors, 
additionally; the number of blue screen ships and the number of Red ships are 
predictors. Figure 46 is the partition tree that was obtained after 15 splits.  
Using partition tree methodology, we try to split the whole data into 
branches to classify whether the ship is survives or not. This recursive 
partitioning process creates a decision tree to classify the members of a 
particular population by splitting into sub populations based on input variables. 
For our case, the input variables are the Blue ship parameters, and we will try to 
classify the binary outcome of the HVU’s survival.  
For a least squares regression, R-squared is the number that indicates 
how well the model is fits. For our partitioning tree, we try to classify a binary 
outcome. Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) is a plot that demonstrates 
the performance of a binary classification system by varying its discrimination 
threshold. So, for partition tree analysis and the nominal logistic regression 
model, the ROC curve is going to show how well we predict the outcome based 
on the model. The curve is obtained by calculating true positive rates and false 
positive rates at varying thresholds and plotting them. To assess the goodness of 
the ROC curve, we compared the Area Under Curve (AUC). The greater AUC is, 
the better our model is. During the analysis, AUC over 0.75 is the threshold of 
goodness. 
While splitting the data, the ROC curve was continuously checked. The 
tree split in Figure 46 shows the split points depending on the response variables 






Figure 46.  Small View of Partition Tree For Analysis of All Factors 
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The tree is first partitioned on Red ASM Blue ship probability of kill at the 
threshold of 0.53. On the left branch, the Blue SAM Red ASM probability of kill 
caused tree to partition at the threshold of 0.241. Down the branch, Red ASM 
launch delay and Red ASM damage function mean is effective on the HVU 
efficiency. Below Red ASM launch delay, Red ASM Blue ship probability of kill is 
effective on the efficiency of HVU at the threshold of 0.182. 
The ROC curve that is obtained from this partition is seen Figure 47. The 
closer the value is to one, the better our model predicts the probability of HVU’s 
survival. In other words, the greater area under the ROC curve, the better a tree 
model classifies the HVU’s survival based on the factors that appear on the tree 
branches. 
 
Figure 47.  The ROC Curve from Partition Tree Analysis of All Factors. 
The AUC for 15 splits is 0.8425. The column contributions, which shows 
the effect of each factor on each partitioning is seen in Figure 48. The factors that 
most affected the response are at the top.  
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Figure 48.  Column Contributions for Partition Tree Analysis of All Factors. 
The number of splits is two on some factors, as seen in Figure 47. This 
shows that some of the variables may have a continuous effect and partition tree 
may not be the best analysis method for this data. So, our main analysis method 
is nominal logistic regression for this set of data. However, we can still have 
some insights about the model using the information in Figure 48. 
The column contributions show the order of importance of the factors. As 
seen in Figure 48, the enemy ship ASMs blue ship probability of kill had the 
largest effect on the likelihood of the HVU’s survival. The most important enemy 
ship properties other than that are the ASM range, the ASM damage mean after 
a successful hit, the gun damage mean after a successful hit, the ASM’s 
maximum speed, the SAM’s launch delay time, and the total number of ASMs. 
These results provide insight about effect of the enemy ships’ ASM properties on 
the likelihood of HVU survival.  
b. Nominal Logistic Regression  
A nominal logistic regression is a regression model in which we have a 
binomial or binary response variable and any type of predictor variables. Logistic 
regression is the methodology that determines the relationship between the 
categorical dependent variables and one or more independent variables. We fit 
the model on a link, which is the logit function. For logistic regression, a link 
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function is a placeholder for the response variable in least squares regression. In 
logistic regression, the model is fit over that link function instead of directly fitting 
on the response variable in a least squares regression. After the model is fit, the 
link function also provides insight into the likelihood of occurrence of the binary 
response variable. In our case, it is the HVU’s survival. 
In this section, a nominal regression is fit on the HVU’s survival as a 
binary outcome. 101 factors are explanatory variables. 99 of them are the factors 
of the NOB design. Two of them are the number of Red ships and the number of 
Blue screen ships in each scenario. 
After making a stepwise regression using minimum Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) (Faraway, 2015), the nominal regression fit includes the variables 
presented in Figures 49 and 50.  
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Figure 49.  Effect Summary of First Nominal Logistic Regression  
for All Factors. 
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Figure 50.  Effect Summary of First Nominal Regression for All Factors 
(continued). 
The model includes most of the factors that are statistically significant. 
However, most of these factors do not have practical significance inside the 
model. The ROC curve obtained from that fit and the AUC is seen in Figure 51.  
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Figure 51.  The ROC Curve for the First Nominal Logistic Regression for 
All Factors. 
As seen in Figure 51, we have 0.92434 AUC if we include all of the factors 
that are seen in Figures 49 and 50. After removing practically insignificant 
factors, the effect summary of the model is seen in Figure 52.  
 
Figure 52.  Effect Summary of Last Nominal Regression for All Factors. 
Statistically significant factors for the AAW Analysis Model are shown in 
Figures 49 and 50. Most of the factors in the AAW Analysis Model are statistically 
significant. With so many significant factors, a simulation is necessary to capture 
complexity. The factors that have practical significance are displayed in Figure 
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52. According to that reduced model, the Red ASM Blue ship probability of kill, 
number of red ships, Blue SAM Red ASM probability of kill, Blue ship SAM range 
and HVU efficiency threshold are among the most significant factors. The ROC 
curve obtained from the reduced model is seen in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53.  The ROC Curve for Last Nominal Logistic Regression for All 
Factors. 
As seen in the figure, we only lose 3% from the AUC value by removing 
most of the factors that are practically insignificant, even if they are statistically 
significant. The prediction profiler shows the effect of the important factors on 
probability of HVU survival. The prediction profiler for the nominal regression 
model is seen in Figures 54, 55 and 56. The y-axis for the prediction profiler is 
only displayed on Figure 54.  
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Figure 54.  Prediction Profiler of Last Nominal Logistic Regression  
for All Factors. 
Blue ship total number of ASMs profiler does not demonstrate a 
predictable pattern. However, as seen in the profiler, the likelihood of HVU 
survival reaches its maximum value when Blue ships have 15 ASMs. Also, the 
Blue ship total number of SAMs has a zigzagged effect on the likelihood of 
survival; whereas, the likelihood of survival is the maximum value when Blue 
ships had 25 SAMs. On the other hand, the probability of HVU survival 
decreases as the number of SAMs and ASMs of enemy ships increases. The 
likelihood of HVU survival is at the minimum level when Red ships have 16 ASMs 
and 26 SAMs. An increase in Blue SAM range increases the probability of 
survival, as it also increases the reaction time against Red ASMs. The zigzagged 
pattern at Blue ship total number of ASMs, SAMs, and Red ship total number of 
ASMs and SAMs stems from the fact that they are discrete variables and 
modeled as ordinal in statistical analysis using JMP.  
 
Figure 55.  Prediction Profiler of Last Nominal Logistic Regression for All 
Factors (continued). 
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The increase in Blue SAM’s Red ASM probability of kill also increases the 
HVU’s probability of survival. On the contrary, as the Red ship’s ASM range and 
Red ASM’s Blue ship probability of kill increases, the likelihood of the HVU’s 
survival decreases. The Close Enough Distance (CED) to impact for Close-In 
Weapon System (CIWS) rounds and gun rounds are the minimum distances 
required to trigger an impact event between the target and the particular gun 
round. As these distances increase, even if CIWS rounds or gun rounds fall far 
from their target, they impact. As the CED for impact of CIWS rounds increases, 
the likelihood of the HVU’s survival increases. So, having more lethal rounds 
increases the probability of survival of the HVU. The HVU gets out of the battle if 
its efficiency gets below a user defined threshold. So, the higher this threshold, 
the less time the HVU stayed in the battle. The higher threshold may be 
interpreted as less armor or risk tolerance for the HVU. The lower the efficiency 
threshold, the more staying power that HVU has. So, the probability of survival 
increases as the efficiency threshold decreases.  
  
Figure 56.  Prediction Profiler of Last Nominal Logistic Regression for All 
Factors (continued). 
The Red ship ASM damage mean decreases the survival of the HVU, as 
expected. The more ASM damage a Red missile delivers, the less the likelihood 
of survival. Lastly, as analyzed in the overview section, increasing the number of 
Blue ships positively affects the likelihood of survival, whereas increasing the 
number of red ships has a negative effect. 
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c. Results Summary 
We have determined the most important factors with both methodologies. 
Most of them were consistent with each other, even if not 100% in agreement. 
Depending on the column contributions in the partition tree and the effect 
summary in the nominal logistic regression, the most important factors are seen 
in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Results Summary for Most Important Factors Among All Factors. 
Methodology  Most Important Factors 
Partition Tree Red ASM Blue Ship Probability of Kill 
Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability of Kill 
Red Ship ASM Range 
Blue Ship SAM Range 
Red Ship ASM Damage Mean 
Blue Ship Gun Range 
Red Ship Gun Damage Mean 
Red Ship ASM Maximum Speed 
HVU Efficiency Threshold 
Red Ship SAM Launch Delay Time 
Red Ship Total Number of ASM 
Logistic Regression Red ASM Blue Ship Probability of Kill 
Number of Red Ships 
Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability of Kill 
Blue Ship SAM Range 
HVU Efficiency Threshold 
Red Ship ASM Range 
Number of Blue Ships 
Red Ship Total Number of ASM 
Blue Ship Total Number of ASM 
Red Ship ASM Damage Mean 
Red Ship Total Number of SAM 
Blue Ship Total Number of SAM 
Blue Ship CIWS CED for Impact of Rounds 
 
As seen in Table 4, results of both models agree on seven of the factors. 
Among those seven factors, three of them are related to Blue ships and the HVU, 
four of them related to enemy ships. The most important factors of Blue ships on 
the HVU survival are Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability of Kill, Blue Ship 
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SAM Range, and HVU Efficiency Threshold. The most effective factors of 
enemy ships are Red ASM Blue Ship Probability of Kill, Red Ship ASM 
Range, Red Ship Total Number of ASM, and Red Ship ASM Damage Mean. 
On the other hand, both models’ results on analysis of all factors agrees 
that the enemy ships’ ASM properties have the greatest effect on likelihood of the 
HVU’s survival. 
4. Analysis on Blue Ship Factors  
a. Partition Tree 
In this section, using the same partition tree methodology, the HVU’s 
survival on Blue ship factors and aggregate output data from all three scenarios 
are analyzed. In other words, in this section, only controllable factors are 
analyzed. 
While splitting the data, the ROC curve was continuously checked. The 
tree split below shows the split points depending on the response variables of 
Blue ship parameters. We have total of 52 factors of Blue ships, including HVU 
ship parameters—which is also a Blue ship, and one factor for the number of 
Blue screen ships in each scenario. To achieve, 0.80 AUC on the classification of 
data, 15 splits are required.  
Small tree view of partition tree analysis is shown in Figure 57. Blue SAM 
Red ASM probability of kill is the most decisive factor for building partition tree. If 
we examine the left branch, It is seen that HVU efficiency threshold, Blue ship 
SAM launch delay, Blue SAM Red ASM probability, Blue ship SAM range, Blue 
ship ASM maximum damage, Blue ship surveillance sensor quality and Blue ship 
ASM launch delay of kill are the most significant factors. When we examine the 
left branch, it is seen that the tree is split on similar factors.  
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Figure 57.  Small View of Partition Tree for Analysis of Blue Ship Factors. 
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The ROC curve obtained from the partition tree is shown in the Figure 58. 
As seen in the plot, the AUC is 0.8029.  
 
Figure 58.  The ROC Curve for Partition Tree of Blue Ship Factors. 
According to the partition tree of Blue ship factors data, the most important 
factors are seen in Figure 59.  
 
Figure 59.  Column Contributions of Partition Tree for Blue Ship Factors.  
The number of splits is two on some factors shown in Figure 59. This also 
shows that the response variable may have a continuous effect, and the partition 
tree may not be the best analysis method for that data—as we encountered in 
the previous partition tree model. So, our main analysis method is again nominal 
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logistic regression for this set of data. However, we can still have some insights 
about the model using the information in Figure 59.  
According to the partition tree model, Blue ship’s SAM Red ship ASM 
probability of kill, Blue ship SAM range, the HVU’s efficiency threshold, which can 
be interpreted as the staying power of the HVU, Blue ships’ CIWS rounds inter-
shot delay time, Blue ship gun range, Blue ship engagement sensor quality, Blue 
ship ASM maximum range, Blue ships’ SAM launch delay time, and Blue ship 
surveillance sensor quality are the most effective factors on the survival of HVU. 
The order of the importance is seen in Figure 59.  
b. Nominal Logistic Regression 
In this section, the nominal regression fit on the HVU’s survival as a binary 
outcome is made again. 49 factors are explanatory variables. 47 of them are the 
factors of NOB design. Two of them are the number of Red ships and the 
number of Blue screen ships in each scenario. 
After running a stepwise regression using minimum Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) and fitting the model on the binary response variable HVU 












Figure 60.  Effect Summary of First Nominal Logistic Regression of Blue 
Ship Factors. 
However, most of the variables’ log worth values are smaller by an order 
of magnitude compared to the most important factor, which is the Blue ship’s 
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SAM Red ASM probability of kill. So, they are statistically significant, but they 
may not have much practical significance. The ROC curve, which also shows the 
quality of the model for the nominal logistic regression is seen in Figure 61, here 
we include all of the statistically significant factors. 
 
Figure 61.  The ROC Curve for the First Logistic Regression for Blue Ship 
Factors. 
The AUC is 0.79163, as seen in the figure. However, the model is not 
useful if it includes most of the factors. So, the factors that are not practically 
significant have been removed from the model, giving us the more parsimonious 
model factors seen in Figure 62.  
 
Figure 62.  Effect Summary of the Last Nominal Logistic Regression of 
Blue Ship Factors. 
 103
Most of the factors in Figure 62 are consistent with the ones which we 
obtained in the partition tree methodology. The ROC curve for the model is 
displayed in Figure 63.  
 
Figure 63.  The ROC Curve of the Last Logistic Regression Blue Ship 
Factors. 
As seen in Figure 63, we only lose 3% of our AUC value, after taking out 
all the practically insignificant predictors. Figures 64 and 65 demonstrate the 
prediction profiler plots of the logistic fit, which show the effect of predictors on 
the response variable. The y-axis for the prediction profiler is only displayed on 





Figure 64.  Prediction Profiler for Logistic Regression of Blue Ship Factors. 
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The total number of ASMs at each Blue ship is an effective factor. Even if 
there is not a clear pattern how it affects the probability of the HVU’s survival, the 
HVU’s survival probability is highest if Blue ships have the maximum number of 
ASMs. The total number of SAMs at each Blue ship has the same effect. The 
likelihood of survival is maximized at 25 SAMs for this scenario. The zigzagged 
pattern at Blue ship total number of ASMs and SAMs stems from the fact that 
they are discrete variables and modeled as ordinal in statistical analysis using 
JMP. The Blue ship SAM range, the Blue ship’s SAM Red ASM probability of kill 
and the Blue ship’s CIWS Red ASM probability of kill also have a very significant 
effect on the likelihood of the HVU’s survival. As they increase, the probability of 





Figure 65.  Prediction Profiler for Logistic Regression of Blue Ship Factors (continued) 
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The HVU’s maximum speed increased the likelihood of survival. This can 
be interpreted as the effect of a decrease in exposure time to threats. An 
increase in the CED to impact for CIWS rounds and gun rounds also increases 
the probability of survival of the HVU. An increase in the HVU efficiency threshold 
decreases the probability of survival as aforementioned in the previous analysis.  
c. Results Summary 
We have determined the most effective factors among Blue ship 
properties with both methodologies. Most of them are consistent with each other, 
even if not 100% in agreement. The most important factors are shown in Table 5 
depending on the analysis methodology. 
Table 5.   Results Summary for Most Important Factors Among Blue Ship Factors. 
Methodology Most Important Factors 
Partition Tree Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability of Kill Blue Ship SAM Range 
HVU Efficiency Threshold 
Blue CIWS Inter Shoot Delay Time 
Blue Gun Range 
Blue Ships Engagement Sensor Quality 
Blue Ships Surveillance Sensor Quality 
Blue Ships ASM Maximum Damage 
Blue Ships SAM Launch Delay Time 
Logistic 
Regression 
Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability of Kill 
Blue Ship SAM Range 
HVU Efficiency Threshold 
Blue Ship Total Number of ASM 
Blue Ship CIWS Red ASM Probability of Kill 
Blue Ship Total Number of SAM 
Blue Ship COD for Impact of CIWS Rounds 
Blue Ship COD for Impact of Gun Rounds 
HVU Maximum Speed 
 
As seen in the table, results of both models agreed on the SAM properties 
and the HVU’s staying power, so among all these factors that we can control, the 
 108
most important three are assessed as Blue Ship’s SAM Red ASM Probability 
of Kill, Blue Ship’s SAM Range and HVU Efficiency Threshold according to 
the analysis of Blue ship factors. 
The model results on Blue ship factors (only controllable) and the models 
on all factors (both controllable and uncontrollable) including Red ship factors 
agree that SAM properties and HVU staying power are the most effective factors 
on likelihood of HVU survival.  
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 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK V.
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Convoy operations in naval combat missions are significant and may have 
crucial effects on an overall campaign’s success. The main purpose of convoy 
operations in naval tactics is the protection of an HVU using surface, air, and 
underwater assets. Threats in a convoy operation may also stem from 
underwater, surface, and air assets. The AAW threat is one of the primary 
concerns in convoy operations.  
In this study, the scope of convoy operations was narrowed down. 
Protection of HVU was modeled with screen ships, along with their sensors and 
weapons. The threat environment was modeled with enemy surface assets, and 
the weapons and sensors they have. The model was built in a generic manner 
such that screen ships and enemy ships, sensors, and weapons can be 
instantiated in any configuration. The Microsoft Access database was used to 
specify characteristics of each ship, and also the weapons and sensors that each 
ship has. Microsoft Access database serves as a GUI for instantiation of each 
scenario.  
The concept of operations, such as positioning of screen ships, the 
layered defense policy, and SAM shooting policies were also modeled inside the 
AAW Analysis Model. The modeling methodology was DES, and the 
implementing tool was the Simkit library of the Java programming language. 
Each component and structure of the AAW Analysis Model was summarized in 
Chapter III. 
Air threats may also stem from the ASMs that are launched from land 
based sites and airplanes. However, neither of them was modeled inside this 
study. Also, eliminating air threats can be done by soft kill methods, such as 
decoys and electronic warfare. In the AAW Analysis Model, only hard kill 
methods were modeled. 
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MOEs were determined to be the efficiency of the HVU at the end of the 
simulation and the binary outcome of whether the HVU survives or not. Before 
starting the simulation, a starting position, a goal, and a path were defined for the 
HVU. Screen ships protected the HVU from their relative positions according to 
the HVU’s position. If the HVU survived until the predefined goal was reached, 
the operation was assumed to be successful. MOPs were defined as the 
characteristics of Blue ships, as they affected the outcome.  
In Chapter IV, a detailed analysis on both controllable and uncontrollable 
factors was made. A total of 99 factors were analyzed in the AAW Analysis 
Model. 52 of factors were controllable and 47 of were uncontrollable. The 
controllable factors consisted of screen ship and HVU characteristics, whereas 
the uncontrollable factors were properties of enemy ships that were posing a 
threat in the operational area.  
Among these 99 factors, two of them were nominal, six of them were 
ordinal categorical variables, and 91 of them were continuous variables. To have 
a favorable correlation among these factors, a NOB LH design (Vieira, 2012) was 
used. This design led to a 3.56% absolute maximum pairwise correlation among 
factors. This design had 512 design points. Each design point included all factors 
input combinations.  
We set up three scenarios varying the number of screen ships and the 
number of Red ships. For each simulation run, the simulation terminated when 
the HVU either reached the goal using its predefined path or was destroyed by 
any enemy ship at any time during the simulation. The simulation was 
run 512,000 times for each of three scenarios. We made a total of 
1,536,000 simulated AAW battles to explore the most effective factors on 
convoy operations under air threat using the AAW Analysis Model. Each run 
took three milliseconds on average using a personal computer, which has 
Intel (R) Core (TM) i7–4810MQ 2.8 Ghz CPU and 8 GB RAM. Run times 
varied depending on the number of ships instantiated.  
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After obtaining the outputs and recording them in a Comma Separated 
Values (CSV) file, we compared the mean efficiency and survival rate of the HVU 
for each scenario and an overall analysis. The comparison showed that 
increasing the number of screen ships increased the HVU’s survival probability, 
whereas more enemy ships decreased it.  
Nominal logistic regression and partition tree methodologies were used to 
analyze the outcome of three scenarios. The outcomes from each scenario were 
aggregated to make the overall analysis. Two different analyses were made to 
capture all the possible insights that can be gained from the model. The first 
analysis included only controllable factors. On the other hand, the second 
analysis included both controllable and uncontrollable factors.  
Both analysis methods were made on the binary response variable of 
HVU survival. Analysis of the controllable factors included controllable factors as 
explanatory variables, whereas analysis of all factors included both 
uncontrollable and controllable factors as explanatory variables. Analysis of 
controllable factors led to a robust design as the analysis collapsed the 
uncontrollable factors. Robust designs help us gain the insights into the model 
when we also include the uncontrollable factors in a DOE.  
The analysis of uncontrollable factors showed that SAM specifications of 
screen ships and the staying power of the HVU were the most effective factors 
among the controllable ones, whereas the analysis of all factors showed that 
ASM specifications of enemy ships were the most impactful on the outcome of 
the HVU’s survival. The most effective factors and their effects on the survival 






Table 6.   Most Effective Factors of AAW Analysis Model.  
Factor Type Effect 
Blue Ship SAM Red ASM Probability 
of Kill 
Controllable Positive 
Blue Ships SAM Range Controllable Positive 
HVU Efficiency Threshold Controllable Positive 
Red ASM Blue Ship Probability of Kill Uncontrollable Negative 
Red Ship ASM Range Uncontrollable Negative 
Red Ship ASM Damage Mean Uncontrollable Negative 
Red Ship Total Number of ASM Uncontrollable Negative 
 
Including the uncontrollable factors in the analysis led to insights about the 
most effective uncontrollable factors on the success of convoy operation, which 
are highlighted in Table 6. This information is crucial and having this before 
starting a convoy operation may yield a better understanding of the vulnerabilities 
to enemy assets.  
While doing the analysis, partition trees were found not to be appropriate 
for the analysis of AAW Model because the response variable of HVU survival 
had a continuous effect on the metamodel. However, the insights gained while 
implementing the partition tree analysis were utilized to conclude about the most 
effective factors in the AAW Analysis Model. 
The interactions between ASMs and SAMs were decisive on the success 
of a convoy operation under air threat. These results stressed the importance of 
soft kill methods, such as usage of decoys and electronic warfare, which may be 
effective in decreasing the probability of successful hit for an ASM. 
We can conclude that for screen ship designs we first need to focus on the 
specifications of SAMs we have. In other words, if we have a limited budget for a 
research and development for screen ships whose primary purpose is AAW, we 
first need to develop SAM properties. These properties may include, but are not 
limited to, SAM speed, successful hit probability, and range. Additionally, before 
starting a convoy operation the most crucial intelligence about the enemy is ASM 
specifications of enemy ships. As aforementioned, another critical research and 
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development area is the electronic warfare concepts which are not modeled in 
this study, because the results of the study demonstrated that decreasing the 
successful probability of ASMs had one of the most impactful effects on the 
probability of the HVU’s survival.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
The AAW Analysis Model is a model of moderate complexity, resolution, 
and fidelity. Even if it serves as a basis for further high fidelity models, it has 
some limitations that are stated in the assumptions. To have a better model, the 
ideas that are stated below may be incorporated into the AAW Analysis Model.  
 Movements are modeled in linear motion. In real life, the movement 
of ships, gun rounds, and missiles are non-linear. Introducing non-
linearity may increase the fidelity. 
 Misclassification is ignored. However, in real operations, it is 
possible and may have drastic results on the outcome of battles. 
So, it needs to be introduced for better analysis.  
 Since the AAW Analysis Model includes 99 factors, and objects 
with many parameters, a graphical user interface (GUI) may be 
useful for making it more user friendly. 
 Evasive maneuvers among opposing or allied units are ignored. 
However, these can be very significant in real operations. 
According to doctrinal needs, they may also be introduced. 
 Soft kill methods are ignored in this study, but inclusion would 
increase the fidelity of future studies. 
 Air threats may also stem from fighter airplanes and land based 
missile sites. So they may also be introduced.  
 For exploring tactics in a particular geographic operational area, 
integration of a geographic information system may be useful. 
While integrating geographic information systems, inclusion of 
meteorological effects on operations needs to be considered. 
 The AAW Analysis Model results are highly dependent on the input 
combinations, ranges, and number of ships instantiated from both 
sides. More insights can be captured with different inputs and initial 
scenario combinations. 
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 Sensors in the AAW Analysis Model are either modeled using a 
constant rate or a cookie cutter approach, introducing a distortion 
factor dependent on the relative distance and offset angle of 
contact. Better sensor modeling approaches can be introduced.  
 Rather than actual data—which is classified—open source data 
was used for the AAW Analysis Model’s input factors. The model 
can be run using real data in a classified environment to obtain 
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